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Some Important Causes for Settlement in American Civil Litigation 
Felipe Forte Cobo a1 
I – Introduction. 
All rational man-made systems are concerned with efficiency. That is an 
undeniable truth. The question, thus, is when a system can be deemed efficient. In order to 
measure the efficiency of a civil justice system an accepted framework is cost-minimization.1 
Through this perspective, as synthetized by Kevin Clermont, civil procedure should maximize 
society’s wealth minimizing social costs.2 In other words, “you cannot reasonably overlook the 
price of pursuing justice, no matter how you wish to define justice.”3 
This analysis of efficiency through decreasing economic costs and increasing 
social gains is reflected in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which provides that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) “should be construed and administered to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”4 By affirming justice as 
a goal as important as speed and cost, the drafters made it clear that these three aims are equally 
important for the FRCP. 
The acceptance of an economic efficiency model is easier in civil litigation than 
criminal prosecution because of the nature of the interests at stake, usually economic and private 
                                                          
a1 State Judge since March 2008, Judiciary Branch of the State of Parana – Brazil; J.D., Universidade de Sao Paulo; 
LL.M. Candidate 2013, University of Georgia. 
1 KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 408 (Thomson West, 2d ed. 2009); SAMUEL 
ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 180-82 (Foundation Press, 2005)  
2 KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 412 (Thomson West, 2d ed. 2009) 
3 KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 412 (Thomson West, 2d ed. 2009) 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 
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ones, as opposed to concerns about life, liberty and punishment. As a consequence, civil justice 
is seen by many less as a search for truth, than a manner to resolve conflicts between two private 
parties,5 contrasting with the criminal justice system where the nature of the interests at stake, 
liberty and even life, requires more than a private peace to satisfy the public perception of 
justice.6 However, it is true that not all civil litigation presents purely economic and private 
matters. In fact, family and civil rights cases are just two examples of civil litigation that 
involves more than economics. For these civil disputes, as with criminal cases, justice is 
something more than pure economic efficiency.7 
This paper is focused in pure economic disputes such as contract, real property 
and tort conflicts, in which the economic efficiency model is very accepted. In this limited 
                                                          
5 Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1196 (2009) 
(“In suits primarily or exclusively about damages, when a defendant agrees to a large payout but professes 
innocence on the charges alleged, most people assume--correctly--that the defendant would not have settled had it 
not believed there was at least some evidentiary basis for the claim. More fundamentally, in most damages actions, 
the claimants are concerned less about a court finding of wrongdoing than they are about recovering compensation 
for their injuries. Moreover, there is a strong societal interest in obtaining the deterrent effects that come from 
compensation in ex post facto settlements. The notion that claimants in suits seeking exclusively or primarily 
damages are disserved by not obtaining a formal court finding of wrongdoing does not comport with reality in many 
circumstances.”) (footnotes omitted); See generally Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury 
Verdicts in A System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (“[T]he major structural reasons for the 
special importance of settlement in American litigation--scarcity of judges and abundance of lawyers, adversarial 
fact-finding, trial by jury--are all manifestations of a single cultural value: the preference for private ordering over 
public control.”) 
6 Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
411, 413 (2009) (“Most observers reasonably view criminal prosecution as a function to be performed exclusively 
by the state. Making charging decisions, plea bargaining, and litigating cases at trial or on appeal would all seem to 
be functions solely within the exclusive province of full-time government lawyers to whom we commonly refer as 
“prosecutors.””); See also Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1125, 1141 (2011) (“Agreeing not 
to report a crime to the police in exchange for consideration is illegal under blackmail statutes in every jurisdiction 
in the United States, generally with potential penalties of a year or more of imprisonment.”) (footnote omitted) 
7 Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273 (2009) (explaining why the author is skeptical 
with settlements as a mean for reaching justice, but always focusing in civil rights or mass litigation cases); See also 
Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement (1984), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2009) 
(“There are cases in which settlement is not desirable. This was apparent from my work with the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund on the briefs and related negotiations among those diverse groups dedicated to eliminating racial 
discrimination. The two most important cases on which I worked were Brown v. Board of Education and the One 
Person-One Vote dispute. They required showdown litigation rather than settlement.”) (footnotes omitted) 
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scenario, the consensual resolution of disputes is always more efficient than decisions made by a 
third-party decision-maker, whether from a post-trial or pre-trial perspective. 
From a post-trial standpoint, whenever a third-person other than the parties 
themselves decides the dispute, her decision may please at best only one of them.8 In fact, if the 
judgment is a full recognition of the plaintiff’s or defendant’s allegations, only one party will be 
satisfied. However, as the parties’ allegations may be only partially recognized, a ruling can 
actually displease both parties. Because of the dissatisfaction of at least one of the parties, the 
legal system faces two consequences, no matter if the decision is a result of a bench or jury trial. 
First, the losing party will be tempted to appeal (no party will appeal if she wins or, at least, 
agrees with the resolution reached by a settlement).9 According to Kevin Clermont, although 
80% of the federal civil appeals are affirmed, still “[n]early one-fifth of losing parties decide that 
they might as well stagger to the finish line, pretty much regardless of the chances on appeal.”10 
On a state level, the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 15% of the civil trials concluded in 
2005 were appealed despite of a reversal rate of approximately 20%.11 In cases where punitive 
damages were awarded by state courts, the percentage of cases appealed was higher, 
approximately 30%.12 Second, the losing party will be less inclined to voluntarily comply with 
the final resolution (after all, she probably disagrees with the result). 
                                                          
8 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in A System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“When a civil dispute ends in trial there is almost always a clear loser, and usually a clear 
winner as well.”) 
9 Donald J. Farole & Thomas H. Cohen, Appeals of Civil Trials Concluded in 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
2 (Oct. 3, 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/actc05.pdf (“In comparison to cases disposed by trial, settlements are 
unlikely to be appealed because they tend to involve the resolution of disputes that could lead litigants to seek 
further legal remedies.”) 
10 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1972 (2009) 
11 Donald J. Farole & Thomas H. Cohen, Appeals of Civil Trials Concluded in 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 1 (Oct. 3, 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/actc05.pdf (showing that from 3,970 civil trials that 
were appealed only 840 trial court outcomes were reversed or modified) 
12 Thomas H. Cohen & Kyle Harbacek, Punitive Damages Awards in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 7 (Mar., 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdasc05.pdf 
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Both consequences directly impact the economic efficiency of the legal system. 
By appealing, the losing party is contributing to overload a court of appeal’s docket, increasing 
the consumption of time, not just for that specific case, but to all other cases on that docket. 
Since lengthy disputes are related to higher litigation costs,13 appeals also increase the costs of 
the legal disputes, whether public (understood as the costs for the maintenance of the court 
itself)14 or private (attorney’s fees),15 especially in a system like the United States which restricts 
litigation cost-shifting. In the federal judicial system for the one year period ending September 
30, 2012 the median time interval from filling a civil appeal in a lower court to final disposition 
on the merits in the appellate court was 30.3 months.16 Regarding state judicial systems, the 
median time interval from filling a civil appeal in a lower court to final disposition on the merits 
in the appellate court was 14 months.17 By not complying with the final resolution, the losing 
party makes a judicial enforcement necessary, adding to a judge’s docket (and this slows down 
                                                          
13 Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011), 
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf (pointing out the results of 
national attorney surveys with Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers, Members of the American Bar 
Association, Section of Litigation, and Members of the National Employment Lawyers Association, which showed 
that 92%, 82% and 73% of each group respectively agreed with the statement “[t]he longer a case goes on, the more 
it costs.” ) 
14 Judicial Branch Expenditures, VIRGINIA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM, 
http://datapoint.apa.virginia.gov/exp/exp_checkbook_agency.cfm?AGYCODE=125  (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) 
(showing that during the year of 2012 the Court of Appeals of Virginia spent $8,729,107.) 
15 Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload Highlights, COURT 
STATISTICS PROJECT, 6 (Jan., 2013) http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx  (pointing out that post-
disposition activity, including any appeal activity, accounted for 8% of total median hours spent by attorneys during 
automobile tort litigation. ) 
16 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2012 – Table B4A, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/B04ASep12.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 
2013) 
17 Donald J. Farole & Thomas H. Cohen, Appeals of Civil Trials Concluded in 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 4 (Oct. 03, 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/actc05.pdf  
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the trial of all other cases) and to the overall costs of the litigation (again public expenditures, 
and private spent with attorney’s fees, as mentioned above).18 
From a pre-trial perspective, settlement is the most efficient form of case 
disposition. For the parties, settlement always means saving litigation costs. In fact, due to the 
absence of a cost-shifting rule in the American civil litigation, no matter who wins, there are still 
unreimbursed litigation costs.19 In this context, from the time the lawsuit is filed, both parties are 
already losers. In other words, the longer it takes a dispute to end, the more both parties are 
losing since their expenses will not be reimbursed by the so-called loser.20 For the state, the 
greatest advantage of settlements under an economic efficiency model is the saving of public 
expenditures with courts, judges and jurors. The sooner legal disputes end, the greater the public 
savings.21 According to Nora Engstrom, adjusting for inflation cost figures provided by Chief 
Justice Burger in 1985, the average public expenditure per trial in 2011 would roughly cost 
$16,300.22 
                                                          
18 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 745 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 
2005) (“For those litigants who seek damages from their opponents, a favorable judgment on the merits may prove 
to be only the first skirmish in what turns out to be a very long, hard-fought battle to collect the award.”); See also 
Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload Highlights, COURT 
STATISTICS PROJECT, 6 (Jan., 2013) http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx  (pointing out how much 
post-disposition activity accounted for the median hours spent by attorneys during litigation: 8% for automobile tort 
cases; 8% for premises liability disputes; 9% for real property litigation, 8% for breach of contract cases; 7% for 
employment litigation; and 7% for professional malpractice cases. ) 
19 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 292 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“This feature of 
remedial law means than an award of compensatory damages, no matter how precisely calculated, will always fall 
short of full compensation if plaintiff has to pay her lawyer.”) 
20 Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 75, 79 (1993) (“Most civil litigation is a negative-sum game. The outcome is a transfer, perhaps equal 
to zero, from the defendant to the plaintiff. This outcome appears to be zero-sum, but since litigation involves 
significant costs in legal fees, expert fees, and time, it becomes more efficient to settle than to litigate.”) 
21 Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource 
Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 149 (2010) (finding that the average public 
expenditure per case in the U.S. is $1,049) 
22 Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 886 n.99 (2011) (“Chief Justice 
Burger stated that the average jury trial costs taxpayers $8300. Warren E. Burger, Opening Remarks, 62 A.L.I. Proc. 
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Thus the advantage of a consensual resolution of litigation resides not only in the 
effectiveness of the resolution, understood as the voluntary compliance with what has been 
determined by the parties themselves, but also in the efficiency of the legal system, expressed in 
a faster and less costly way to end the controversy to both the judiciary and the parties. In fact, as 
pointed out by Professor Kevin Clermont, “[f]rom the viewpoint of the civil justice system, 
settlement is a critical need. Ours is a slow and expensive procedure. The system simply would 
not be able to adjudicate all cases filed. We depend on the parties finding alternatives to using 
the system.”23 Sharing the same view, District Judge Jack Weinstein states that 
Settlements may be even more desirable in the mass 
commercial age in which we now live. Unsettled disputes about 
harms to large numbers of people across geographic and 
demographic lines, caused by large entities, present risks of social 
breakdowns without fair, timely, and efficient resolution. Time-
consuming adjudication results in excessive transaction costs and 
unnecessary stress on individuals, families, local and national 
economies, and government service networks. If we persist in 
trying each dispute as if it were a unique horse-and-buggy collision 
at a muddy intersection in nineteenth-century Cairo, Illinois, 
businesses may be unfairly saddled with continuing litigations 
while individuals claiming harm may be left almost indefinitely 
adrift. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
32, 36 (1985). Adjusted to today's dollars, this equals roughly $16,300. Inflation was calculated pursuant to CPI 
Inflation Calculator, supra note 90.”) 
23 KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 87 (Thomson West, 2d ed. 2009) 
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Most mass tort cases must be disposed of by 
settlement. Trying each of them would completely overwhelm the 
nation's courts.24 
Settlements are more than an important tool for the economic efficiency model of 
the civil justice system, they are a necessity for how the American civil procedure is currently 
conceived. 25 There is a public interest in settling as many cases as possible. 26 That perception is 
supported by the actual number of cases that go to trial in the federal civil justice system, making 
the American civil procedure one of settlements.27 During a 12-month period ending September 
30, 2012, from the total amount of 271,385 cases terminated within the U.S. District Courts, only 
3,212 (approximately 1%) reached the trial stage.28 This low trial percentage pattern is also seen 
in the state judicial system. According to Michael Heise, in a study using one year of civil jury 
trial outcomes from 45 of the nation’s 75 most populous counties, only 3.5% of civil actions 
                                                          
24 Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement (1984), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1266 
(2009) 
25 Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reexamining the Arguments in Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1171, 1172 (2009) (“The first challenge is the inefficiency of the civil justice system. If you are against settlement in 
any realistic way, however you define it, what is the alternative? Few can agree with Owen in terms of the practical, 
day-to-day running of the civil justice system. The articles you read today are about the vanishing trial, not against 
settlement. No one wants to go to trial. The consumers of the civil justice system do not like the costs, the 
inefficiencies, the uncertainties, the frustrations, or the delays. That's one practical problem that undercuts the 
aspirational objective.”) 
26 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1996) (“We prefer settlements and have designed a system of civil justice that embodies and express 
that preferences in everything from the rules of procedure and evidence, to appellate opinions, to legal scholarship, 
to the daily work of our trial judges. Our culture portrays trial-especially trial by jury- as the quintessential dramatic 
instrument of justice. Our judicial system operates on a different premise: Trial is a disease, not generally fatal, but 
serious enough to be avoided at any reasonable cost.”) (footnotes omitted) 
27 Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 449-50 
(1994) (“Empirical evidence indicates that over 90 percent of cases filed are settled out of court…”) (footnote 
omitted) 
28 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2012 – Table C04, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C04Sep12.pdf  (last visited Mar.16, 
2013) 
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proceeded to a trial disposition.29 More recently, a civil justice survey of state courts nationwide 
found that during the year 2005 trials accounted for approximately 3% of all tort, contract and 
real property dispositions in general jurisdiction courts.30 In this scenario, it is crucial for lawyers 
and judges to identify the important causes for settlement. From a lawyer’s perspective, the 
importance of understanding this phenomenon lies in the fact that most of her work will be 
performed as a settlement advisor, instead of as a litigator.31 For judges, it is vital for the 
management of their dockets to foster the consensual resolution of disputes in order to keep the 
judicial dockets clear and ready for those cases that really need to be tried.32 Even with 
approximately 1% of all civil cases filed within the Federal District Courts reaching the trial 
                                                          
29 Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 813, 823 (2000) (“Only a small fraction (3.5 percent) of civil actions proceeded to a trial disposition. Because 
so few cases filed wind up reaching trial, it is possible that the relatively small number of civil jury cases--the focus 
of this study--differs systematically from the larger pool of civil disputes from which they emerge. Indeed, there are 
strong theoretical reasons to expect certain differences generated by a selection effect. Expectations theory predicts 
that objectively strong and weak civil cases will settle or conclude prior to reaching a jury trial.”) (footnotes omitted) 
30 Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 1 (Oct., 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf  
31 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1952-53 (2009) (“Shifting from 
the viewpoint of the system to that of the disputants, settlement is also of critical importance. For them, in the usual 
course, settlement is our system of justice (and for their “trial” lawyers, negotiation of settlements--and pursuit of 
other alternatives to litigation--is what their profession primarily entails).”) 
32 Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1210-12 
(2009) (“To illustrate this point, I highlight below two of the things settlement offers to litigation: docket clearance 
and selective case filtering…. The most conspicuous of settlement's contributions to modern litigation is its capacity 
to reduce the number of cases demanding judicial resources and attention. Fiss appears to imagine that docket 
lightening is, in fact, settlement's only contribution to our judicial system. Likening settlement to plea bargaining, he 
declares both of them to be undeserving of praise. At best, he says, they are realities that must be suffered under the 
constraints of current conditions. It is not my intention to weigh into the conversation about the morality of plea 
bargaining, although I may be more sympathetic to its functioning than Fiss. Instead, I acknowledge at least part of 
Fiss's point: settlement permits courts to function properly because of settlement's docket-management function…. 
Settlement offers at least the prospect of filtering out the “right” cases. Of course, one might argue that settlements 
are, by the virtue of party autonomy, the “right” cases, by some simplistic definition. By this logic, unless some 
form of coercion or other improper influence operates on disputants, causing them to settle, a private settlement is 
evidence that the parties judged their consensual option superior to the prospects of litigation. In this mercenarily 
individual-rationality sense, at least, settled cases were the “right” ones to settle, and those that do not settle were the 
“right” ones to litigate…. But my point here is not about satisfying parties' interests. Instead my point is that 
litigation fulfills its public function best if it is not called upon as the method of resolving every kind of dispute.”) 
(footnotes omitted) 
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stage, this small percentage of cases still wait for approximately twenty-four months to be 
tried.33  Imagine what would happen if that percentage rate was higher. 
Therefore, settlements in pure economic disputes are more efficient than trials 
whether from a private or public perspective. From a private standpoint, settlements make the 
dispute resolution much less expensive and faster for the parties since settlements prevent trial, 
appeals, and judicial enforcement. From a public standpoint, settlements save public resources 
such as courts, judges and jurors. Since the civil justice system must be concerned with 
efficiency, this paper intends to uncover some significant causes for settlement in American civil 
litigation in order to keep fostering consensual resolution of disputes. Considering that lower 
transaction costs drive parties towards settlement,34 part II of this essay provides an overview of 
the American costs of legal disputes, framing several issues that might be determinative to 
settlements. Part III explores how two specific American procedural institutes – discovery and 
civil jury trial – contribute to settlements in the U.S. modern civil litigation. At the end, this 
paper shows that the high settlement rate observed in the American civil litigation is not an 
accident but a consequence of procedural tools and public policies that externalize an American 
predilection for settlements instead of trials. 
II – Transaction Cost of American Legal Disputes 
                                                          
33 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2012 – Table C04, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C04Sep12.pdf  (showing that during 
a 12-month period only 1.2% of the total civil cases terminated within the Federal District Courts reached trial.) (last 
visited Mar.16, 2013) 
34 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 554 (Little, Brown and Company, 4th ed.1992) (“That cases 
are ever litigated rather than settled might appear to violate the principle that when transaction costs are low, parties 
will voluntarily transact if a mutually beneficial transaction is possible. In fact the vast majority of legal disputes are 
settled without going to trial; one study found that only 2 percent of automobile accident claims are actually tried. 
This is as economic theory would predict, but we have still to explain the small fraction that got to trial.”) (footnote 
omitted) 
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Cost-minimization is the core of what can be called an economic model for civil 
litigation which provides a coherent and objective guideline in the attempt of determining the 
parties’ behavior in pure economic disputes.35 Accordingly, a party’s goal is the best cost/benefit 
relationship which is expressed by a balance between low costs and high benefits. For this 
model, efficiency is achieved when a party pays the cheapest price for getting the closest she can 
to her optimal dispute outcome. Since settlements occur when they express a party’s best 
cost/benefit relationship, it is important to understand the costs of legal disputes in the United 
States and in which ways they might be determinative of dispute outcomes. 
Transaction costs of legal disputes are basically spread through bargaining costs, 
discovery costs36 and litigation costs.37 Each of these three costs will be mostly defined by court 
costs, attorney’s fees and expert witness fees.38 Court costs usually are filling fees, copying fees 
and cost for witnesses.39 Attorney’s fees are billed whether hourly, flatly or on contingency.40 
Hourly and flat billings are the most usual way for charging for legal services except for 
plaintiffs in personal injury cases that ordinarily use contingency fees.41 
                                                          
35 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 108 (Foundation Press, 2005) 
36 Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 11 (2011), 
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf  (showing that half of the 
lawyers answering to a national attorney survey pointed out that discovery consumes at least 70% of expenditures in 
cases that are not tried.) 
37 Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 449 
(1994) 
38 See generally Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload 
Highlights, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 1-2 (Jan., 2013) http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx  (acknowledging the 
preponderance of the attorney’s and expert witness’ fees to the total cost of the legal disputes.) 
39 Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of 
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 94-
95 (2005) 
40 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.5 (2012) 
41 STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 131 (Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business, 9th ed. 2012) (“If we omit personal injury cases, where contingent fees predominate, flat rates and hourly 
billing are the most common ways lawyers charge for their services.”) 
11 
 
Nora Engstrom provides some dollar figures for the cost of litigation in the U.S. 
According to her, a defendant would pay approximately $9,900 to defend each lawsuit in 
automobile tort litigation.42 Providing some more figures, the Preliminary Report to the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, based on a survey of attorneys from May to 
June, 2009, stated that 
For the closed cases included in the sample, the 
median cost, including attorney fees, was $15,000 for plaintiffs and 
$20,000 for defendants. For plaintiffs, reported costs ranged from 
$1,600 at the 10th percentile to $280,000 at the 95th percentile; for 
defendants, the range was from $5,000 at the 10th percentile to 
$300,000 at the 95th percentile.43 
More recently, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) released a study with several 
median costs of litigation depending on case type. Accordingly, the median cost of litigation for 
cases that progressed all way through trial and post-disposition proceedings was: for automobile 
tort cases – $43,000; for premises liability cases – $54,000; for real property – $66,000; for 
employment – $88,000; for contract – $91,000; and for professional malpractice – $122,000.44 
                                                          
42 Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 825 (2011) 
43 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 2 (Oct., 2009), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf 
44 Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload Highlights, COURT 
STATISTICS PROJECT, 7 (Jan., 2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx  
12 
 
Attorney’s fees often account for the major expense in the costs of legal 
dispute. 45 Regarding the total value charged by a lawyer at the end of a legal dispute, attorney’s 
fees billed by hour should not vary that much from flat or contingency fees, since they all take in 
account the expected amount of time required to perform a specific legal task.46 Still, one could 
think that lawyers working on contingency basis would be prone to charge more because of the 
inherent risk of recovering nothing.47 Surprisingly, according to a 2009 Federal Judicial Center 
study, “[h]ourly billing was associated with higher reported costs for plaintiff attorneys. Plaintiff 
attorneys charging by the hour reported costs almost 25% higher than those using other billing 
methods (primarily contingency fee), all else equal.”48  
Since legal fees are proportionally charged to the dispute’s complexity and 
length,49 time plays an important role in defining the costs of the legal dispute.50 The math is 
                                                          
45 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 521 (Little, Brown and Company, 4th ed.1992) (“The 
government subsidy of litigation is modest. The main expenses – attorneys’ fees – are borne entirely by the 
litigants.”); See also Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 
12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 357, 374 (2011) (discussing the different impacts of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
68 depending on whether it includes or not attorney’s fees, “which account for the majority of litigation expenses.”); 
See generally Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload 
Highlights, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 1-2 (Jan., 2013) http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx  (acknowledging the 
attorney’s preponderance to the total cost of the legal disputes, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has 
developed a method for cost estimation: the Civil Litigation Cost Model (CLCM), relying on the amount of time 
expended by attorneys in various litigation tasks.) 
46 STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 131 (Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business, 9th ed. 2012) (“[F]lat fees are often hourly rates in disguise. A lawyer predicts how much time the work 
will require (probably estimating high) and multiplies by an hourly rate.”); See generally STEPHEN GILLERS, 
REGULATION OF LAWYERS PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 144 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 9th ed. 2012) 
(explaining that the amount of work required is one of the factors a lawyer will take in consideration when deciding 
the contingency fee arrangement.) 
47 Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL 
L. REV. 357, 367 (2011) (“A successful plaintiff's attorney will generally be entitled to a larger compensation under 
a contingency fee system than under an hourly rate, due to the attorney assuming the risk of receiving no payment at 
all.”) (footnote omitted) 
48 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, 6 (Mar., 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf  
49 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(1) (2012) (providing for the need of reasonable fees, proportional to 
the time spent by the lawyer) 
50 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, 5-7 (Mar., 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf  
13 
 
intuitively simple, the sooner the dispute ends, the less the party spends on attorney’s fees. The 
Judicial Business of the United States Courts Report 2012 points out that the median time 
interval from filing to disposition of civil cases may vary from 7.6 months to 23.5 months, 
depending on whether the dispute ended before pretrial stage or at trial stage.51 That range might 
provide some idea about how much the cost of legal dispute may vary, especially when the 
lawyer is hired on an hourly fee basis, if a case faces a full trial scenario instead of an early 
settlement one. Analyzing the results of a 2009 Federal Judicial Center study, Danya Shocair 
Reda highlights that “[u]nsurprisingly, when a case was terminated through trial, it also tended to 
have higher costs, around twenty-four percent higher than cases not ending in trial, all other 
factors being equal.”52 However, that twenty-four percent cost increasing was observed from a 
defendant’s perspective. From a plaintiff’s perspective, cases terminated by trial had even higher 
costs than cases that did not, approximately 53%, all else equal.53 
Because attorney’s services present a cost to the parties involved in a legal dispute 
and because this cost is usually proportional to the length of that dispute, the mere presence of 
lawyers should push the parties towards settlement, as quickly as possible, so they could save 
attorney’s costs. On the other hand, since in practice attorneys might have a private economic 
interesting on longer or shorter litigation (usually depending on the fee arrangement) one might 
argue that they will frame the dispute to their clients in such a way so that it reflects their 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(finding that cases with longer processing times were associated with higher reported costs for plaintiffs and 
defendants, all else equal) 
51 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2012 – Table C05, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C05Sep12.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 
2013) 
52 Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. 
L. REV. 1085, 1110 (2012) 
53 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging , Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, 5 (Mar., 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf  
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preference towards settlement or trial.54 In this scenario, hourly practitioners would be prone to 
risk their client’s chances on trials,55 while lawyers working on flat or contingency fee 
agreements would face a huge incentive to settle a dispute even when, according to their client’s 
best interest, it would be better to try the case.56 Expressing this dual role that an attorney might 
have towards or not a settlement, Jeffrey Rachlinski points out: 
[T]he framing model of litigation poses a powerful role for the 
attorney. The attorney can control the client's frame, thereby 
influencing settlement decisions in either direction. The attorney 
may or may not use this ability to serve his clients' best interests. 
                                                          
54 Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL 
L. REV. 357, 368 (2011) (“The attorney's personal stake in the case may also encourage unethical behavior, conflicts 
of interest between the attorney and client, and the pursuit of unconscionably large settlements. Mistrust may corrupt 
the attorney-client relationship if the client receives less net compensation than anticipated, or the attorney collects a 
large fee relative to the work performed. If a defendant offers to settle immediately, an attorney may be tempted to 
accept the offer and receive a large payday for merely filing a complaint, even though the attorney knows the client 
is likely to receive a larger payment at the end of a lengthy and work-intensive trial.”) (footnotes omitted) 
55 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 170 (1996) 
(“Initially, attorneys seem to face an incentive structure that promotes wasteful litigation. To the extent that the 
litigation lasts longer and the parties decline to settle, attorneys make more money in fees.”); 
56 Angela Wennihan, Let's Put the Contingency Back in the Contingency Fee, 49 SMU L. REV. 1639, 1654-55 
(1996) (“At first glance, the contingency fee seems to align the attorney's interests with that of the client. And to 
some extent, that is clearly true. Obviously, both the client and the contingent fee attorney have the same general 
interest in the outcome in the case. However, the contingent fee does not necessarily lead an attorney to devote the 
amount of time and effort to a case that would maximize the client's net return. 
If a particular number of hours of work would result in the largest net recovery for the client, the client desires the 
attorney to work that amount of hours. However, the lawyer has no direct economic incentive to work that particular 
number of hours because her goal is to get the largest amount of recovery in the shortest amount of time. ‘Lawyers 
on contingent fee are said to have an incentive to make a ‘quick kill’ before too many additional hours are spent at 
possibly only a marginal increase in the lawyer's fee.’ Thus, the contingent fee system can create an incentive for an 
attorney to deprive the client of the right to make her own decisions in litigation, such as when to settle a claim. The 
lawyer and the client have the same interests only when the case goes to the jury; before that time the attorney 
actually has a strong incentive to settle the case, which could be in conflict with the plaintiff's best interests.”) 
(footnotes omitted), See also Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1224-25 (2009) (“Agents sometimes negotiate settlements with which their clients are 
disappointed. In an ideal world, agents would understand and represent fully their principals' views of the relevant 
interests, parameters, tradeoffs, and opportunities. In practice, agents do not always understand their clients' 
priorities and underlying interests. In practice, agents sometimes have incentives at least partially at odds with some 
of their clients' interests. And, as a practical matter, agents cannot always bring every decision back to their clients 
for a new round of consultation. People do not merely hire agents for the agents' skill sets. Sometimes, a client hires 
an agent because the client does not have the bandwidth to do everything himself or herself. With the delegation of a 
task to an agent comes the risk that the agent will behave differently than the client would prefer.”) (footnote 
omitted) 
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An avaricious defense attorney who works on an hourly rate may 
portray all settlements as losses so as to encourage the risk-seeking 
proclivities of the client. After all, the defense attorney is the 
principle beneficiary of risk-seeking decisions in litigation. 
Likewise, a plaintiff's attorney, operating on a contingency fee and 
interested in a quick settlement, may encourage the client's 
inherent risk-aversion.57 
Coincidence or not, a study conducted by Thomas Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard and 
Dean Miletich found that “[d]isposition times were also related to the attorney’s billing method. 
Cases in which the attorney reported billing on an hourly basis took longer than other cases.”58 
Still, Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud remember that trying a case against the 
client’s interest violates rules of professional conduct and, as far as a survey with lawyers that 
have tried cases in California Superior Courts shows, conflicts of interests between attorney’s 
and clients were not a significant cause for trials.59 With many variables, differing from case to 
                                                          
57 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 172 (1996) 
58 Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and 
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 533 (1998) 
59 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in A System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 54 (1996) (“We do not doubt that plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants' insurers sometimes act in conflict 
with the best interests of the parties. But we do not believe that such conflicts (strategic or otherwise) are a common 
cause of trials. Taking a case to trial against the interests of the client violates professional norms, and may subject 
the attorney or the insurance company to formal or informal sanctions. Norms and sanctions do not eliminate abuses, 
but they do suggest that the disfavored behavior is the exception rather than the rule. In this context, our survey data 
are consistent with that expectation. The attorneys we interviewed frequently said that the trial was caused by the 
opposition's stupidity or stubbornness, but no defense attorney said that there was no settlement because the 
plaintiff's attorney wanted a shot at a major verdict, and no plaintiff's lawyer said that it happened because the 
defendant's insurance company had little to risk at trial and was unconcerned about its insured.”) (footnotes omitted) 
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case and perhaps from lawyer to lawyer, it is unclear whether attorneys foster settlements or 
not.60 
Another specific feature of the U.S. legal system is that it provides that the parties 
should bear most of the costs of litigation since the expenses with evidence production and legal 
representation are not borne by the government.61 Each party must pay for the expenses of its 
own investigation of facts. The system usually does not provide for public attorneys advocating 
purely private matters, not even for the needy.62 Although pro bono legal services are 
encouraged by professional rules,63 American lawyers on average provide only thirty-nine hours 
                                                          
60 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 170-71 (1996) 
(“Furthermore, even attorneys paid on an hourly rate may be more interested in maintaining a continuing 
relationship with their clients than extracting extra fees in any single case. Gilson and Mnookin also have proposed 
that attorneys have the ability to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma that litigation creates. Thus, it is unclear whether 
attorneys are a positive or a negative influence on the social costs of litigation.”) (footnotes omitted) 
61 Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 474-
75 (1994) (“We have a system that requires the parties to bear many of the costs of litigation....Why should lawyers 
not be provided as a public service to any litigant who would rather trust a public lawyer than pay a private lawyer? 
Why should other costs of investigation and preparation not be paid according to the budget judgments of a public 
official? And so of discovery: Why should any part of the cost be carried by the parties, much less nonparties? There 
is something crude and almost offensive about rationing access to public dispute resolution by ability and 
willingness to pay, but we do it.”) 
62 Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1228 
(2009) (“In practice, modern disputants encounter a number of different barriers to court access. The most 
conspicuous reason disputants might not perceive themselves to have access to the courthouse stems from financial 
concerns. In short, litigation is expensive, and many--accurately-- perceive litigation's justice as beyond their price 
range.”); See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the 
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 134-35 (2010) (pointing out 
surveys showing that only 37% of poor households facing legal needs actually sought third party assistance in U.S. 
versus 65% in Scotland) 
63 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2012) (“Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide 
legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal 
services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: (a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) 
hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to: (1) persons of limited means or (2) charitable, religious, 
civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters that are designed primarily to address the 
needs of persons of limited means; and (b) provide any additional services through: (1) delivery of legal services at 
no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, 
civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational 
organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees 
would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate; (2) delivery 
of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or (3) participation in activities for 
improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession. In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute 
financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.”) 
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a year of it, approximately 2% of all legal effort.64 On the top of that, the American rule prevents 
the winner from recovering the whole transaction cost of the legal dispute, since it restricts cost-
shifting.65 This system has been long criticized because of its apparent unfairness. Wealth 
imbalance between plaintiff and defendant might be more determinative of the outcome than the 
merits of the dispute.66 The argument supports that plaintiffs and defendants could use their 
wealth to force an unfair settlement on the weakest party, defined as the one who lacks enough 
economic resources to equally pursuit its rights all the way through bargaining, discovery and 
trial stages. That is the view of Owen Fiss, who argues that 
The disparities in resources between the parties can 
influence the settlement in three ways. First, the poorer party may 
be less able to amass and analyze the information needed to predict 
the outcome of the litigation, and thus be disadvantaged in the 
bargaining process. Second, he may need the damages he seeks 
immediately and thus be induced to settle as a way of accelerating 
payment, even though he realizes he would get less now than he 
might if he awaited judgment. All plaintiffs want their damages 
immediately, but an indigent plaintiff may be exploited by a rich 
defendant because his need is so great that the defendant can force 
him to accept a sum that is less than the ordinary present value of 
                                                          
64 Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource 
Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 130-31 (2010) 
65 Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 474-
75 (1994) (“[T]he victor is awarded some part of the costs to an extent that depends on the nature of the litigation, 
while victor and vanquished each bear substantial portions of their own costs.”) 
66 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 287 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“[E]ither outcome 
may represent surrender to financial exigency: A plaintiff gives up strong case because she cannot afford to litigate 
any further; a defendant offers something to make a plaintiff with a trumped-up claim go away because winning on 
the merits will cost more than the settlement offered.”) 
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the judgment. Third, the poorer party might be forced to settle 
because he does not have the resources to finance the litigation, to 
cover either his own projected expenses, such as his lawyer's time, 
or the expenses his opponent can impose through the manipulation 
of procedural mechanisms such as discovery. It might seem that 
settlement benefits the plaintiff by allowing him to avoid the costs 
of litigation, but this is not so. The defendant can anticipate the 
plaintiff's costs if the case were to be tried fully and decrease his 
offer by that amount. The indigent plaintiff is a victim of the costs 
of litigation even if he settles. 67 
Supporting this assumption, an analysis based on national surveys of attorneys, 
including members of the American College of Trial Lawyers (“ACTL”), the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) and the National Employment Lawyers Association (“NELA”), found that 
“in the experience of all of the attorney groups, the cost of litigation does hinder access to 
judicial case determination on the merits.”68 In fact, the majorities of attorneys answered that 
their firms would turn away cases when it is not cost-effective to handle them (accordingly, 
ACTL: 81%; ABA: 82%; NELA: 88%).69 More than that, the majority also agreed that the costs 
                                                          
67 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (footnote omitted) 
68 Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011), 
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf  
69 Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011), 
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf  
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of litigation force cases to settle that should not settle based on the merits (accordingly, ACTL: 
83%; ABA: 83%; NELA: 59%).70 
However, some scholars have advocated that a powerful tool has been more used 
recently to compensate that potential wealth imbalance – third-party funding of litigation.71 
Contingent-fee agreements have allowed plaintiffs who lack financial resources to hire very 
sophisticated law firms with economic capacity to fund expensive litigation.72 This third-party 
funding has made possible huge settlements favoring those plaintiffs as it happened in the Vioxx 
case, settled with $4.85 billion.73 For them, big law firms, working on contingency basis and 
financing the transaction costs of the legal dispute, would be an effective remedy against a 
wealthy defendant who would be prevented from forcing a settlement on an unfair basis just 
because of a plaintiff’s lack of financial capacity for litigation.74   
                                                          
70 Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011), 
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf  
71 Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL 
L. REV. 357, 367 (2011) (“To nullify these concerns, perhaps the most beneficial, and arguably most detrimental, 
feature of the American Rule has developed--contingent fees…. The contingency fee system ensures those with 
valid claims will not be discouraged from pursuing their legal rights due to personal financial limitations. In 
addition, contingency fees allow individual plaintiffs to challenge large institutional defendants and use litigation as 
a means for initiating societal reform.”) (footnotes omitted) 
72 Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1180-81 
(2009) (“We are hardly the first commentators to note the rise in strong, financially successful plaintiff law firms 
with the capacity to prosecute and fund expensive and protracted litigation. These firms are capable of litigating 
against the largest, most powerful defense law firms in the country”) (footnotes omitted) 
73 Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1183 
(2009) 
74 Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 813, 845-46 (2000) (“When a plaintiff secures the financial backing of a lawyer, or more likely a law firm, the 
economic differences between the typical plaintiff (an individual) and defendant (a non-individual) erode. Put 
differently, in such circumstances an “individual” plaintiff benefiting from contingency fee financing begins to 
resemble a “non-individual” in terms of financial resources. And, as previously discussed, results in Table 6 reveal 
that the presence of non-individuals in civil litigation correlates with longer case disposition time.”) 
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Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud emphasize the importance of third-party funding 
to legal disputes nowadays. 75 According to their empirical study with claims for monetary 
damages that actually went to trial in California Superior Courts (thus, incurring in all 
transaction costs), individual plaintiff attorneys were paid on a contingent-fee basis for 96% of 
the times.76 Besides, 88% of the individual plaintiffs have the out-of-pocket costs of litigation at 
least partially advanced by their attorneys.77 On the other hand, although defense attorneys were 
almost invariably paid by the hour, 78 72% of all defendants had their legal fees and costs entirely 
paid by their insurance company.79 In light of these numbers, they conclude: 
Thus, the typical civil jury trial is a personal injury claim by an 
individual against a large company, in which neither party is 
playing with its own money: The plaintiff is represented by an 
attorney whose fee and expenses will be paid out of the recovery 
(if any), and the defendant has an insurance policy that covers all 
defense costs and any likely judgment. 
However, if a third-party is funding the litigation, it means that a party other than 
the plaintiff and the defendant possesses an economic interest at stake. Whether that situation 
affects settlements or not should depend on two factors. First, the attorney’s compliance with the 
professional rules which establish the ethical duties for lawyers and conflicts of interests. As set 
                                                          
75 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) 
76 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1996) 
77 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 17 (1996) 
78 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1996) 
79 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1996) 
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forth above, a lawyer should not decide whether to settle or not based on her private interest on 
the case. 80 Second, the liability insurance contract which defines who has the power to accept or 
reject settlements, the insurer or the insured. Even from an economic standpoint, insurer and 
insured may have different interests on settling ot a dispute. Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud 
explain these different interests pointing out that: 
If the plaintiff makes a demand at or near the policy limit, the 
defendant will probably want to take the settlement, which is free 
to him, rather than risk a trial after which he might be stuck with 
personal liability for damages above that limit. Most liability 
insurance contracts, however, give the insurance company the 
power to accept or reject settlements, and the insurance company 
may prefer a trial: It cannot lose more than the policy limit one 
way or the other, and, for the price of trying the case, it might save 
itself a settlement of about that amount.81 
Another unique feature of the American legal dispute costs is the so called 
“American rule”. Accordingly, none of the dispute costs are subject to reimbursement by the 
losing party.82 In other words, for most cases, the loser is not required to pay for the winner’s 
expenses regarding both attorney’s fees and court costs. As the American system restricts cost-
                                                          
80 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 54 (1996) (“Taking a case to trial against the interests of the client violates professional norms, and may 
subject the attorney or the insurance company to formal or informal sanctions. Norms and sanctions do not eliminate 
abuses, but they do suggest that the disfavored behavior is the exception rather than the rule.”) (footnotes omitted) 
81 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 53-54 (1996) (footnotes omitted) 
82 Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL 
L. REV. 357, 365 (2011) (“Under the American Rule, a prevailing litigant may not recover their expenditures on fees 
from the opposing party.”) (footnote omitted) 
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shifting, the plaintiff will always fall short of full compensation.83 Because of that feature, from 
the time the lawsuit is filed, both parties are already losers. Moreover, since time is money, 84 the 
longer it takes for the dispute to come to an end, the more both parties are losing, since their 
expenses will proportionally increase.85 The high costs of litigation in U.S. together with the lack 
of a cost-shifting rule might be the reason why it is estimated that only 46% of the total tort 
litigation cost goes to victims, whether as economic or non-economic damages.86 
In this situation, the American legal restriction on cost-shifting should make 
parties more willing to settle the dispute since they are not going to recover the money they are 
investing on it.87 However, this view is not shared by Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud to whom 
the American rule actually creates incentive to trials since it reduces the monetary risks to the 
losing party.88 In fact, the adoption of a cost-shifting rule would make the loser pay not just for 
                                                          
83 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 292 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“This feature of 
remedial law means than an award of compensatory damages, no matter how precisely calculated, will always fall 
short of full compensation if plaintiff has to pay her lawyer.”) 
84 Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011), 
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf (pointing out the results of 
national attorney surveys with Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers, members of the American Bar 
Association, Section of Litigation, and members of the National Employment Lawyers Association, which showed 
that 92%, 82% and 73% of each group respectively agreed with the statement “[t]he longer a case goes on the more, 
the more it costs.” ) 
85 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, 5-7 (Mar., 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf 
(finding that the longer a case takes to reach termination, the higher the costs will be, all else equal: for plaintiffs, a 
1% increase in case duration is associated with 0.32% increase in costs; for defendants, a 1% increase in case 
duration is associated with a 0.26% increase in costs.) 
86 Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of 
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 90 
(2005) 
87 David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the "American Rule" 
and "English Rule", 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 609 (2005) (“To pose the argument in a slightly different 
manner, under the “American rule,” if both parties are certain of victory, they will still settle in cases where the cost 
of victory at trial is more than the cost of settling; whereas, the “English rule” would encourage the litigants to 
proceed to trial in order to have a full recovery in the case of the plaintiff, or no loss in the case of the defendant. 
Thus, one may conclude that “‘the likelihood of trial under the British system will be greater than under the 
American system.’”) (footnotes omitted) 
88 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1996) (“The alternative to attempting to provide more information about the outcome of the case 
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her own expenses but also for her adversary’s. Because parties are more willing to settle before 
high risk scenarios, changing the American rule and increasing the amount that a party may have 
to pay in case she loses the dispute would make both parties more willing to settle the dispute.89 
Hence, the American rule would discourage settlements. 
The drafters of the Federal Rules seemed to have embraced this rationale in Rule 
68,90 which provides: 
(a) MAKING AN OFFER; JUDGMENT ON AN ACCEPTED OFFER. At 
least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against 
a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment 
on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days 
after being served, the opposing party serves written notice 
accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice 
of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter 
judgment. 
(b) UNACCEPTED OFFER. An unaccepted offer is considered 
withdrawn, but it does not preclude a later offer. Evidence of an 
unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to 
determine costs. 
(c) OFFER AFTER LIABILITY IS DETERMINED. When one party's 
liability to another has been determined but the extent of liability 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
is to alter the rules under which it is litigated. The common method is to increase the risk of trial by requiring the 
losing party to pay some or all of the winners’ legal fees…. The result might be an overall change in the pattern of 
civil litigation, including, perhaps, a reduction in the number of trials.”) 
89 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1996) 
90 FED. R. CIV. P. 68 
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remains to be determined by further proceedings, the party held 
liable may make an offer of judgment. It must be served within a 
reasonable time—but at least 14 days—before the date set for a 
hearing to determine the extent of liability. 
(d) PAYING COSTS AFTER AN UNACCEPTED OFFER. If the judgment 
that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the 
unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the 
offer was made. 91 
In Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985), the Supreme Court explained that 
The plain purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and avoid 
litigation. Advisory Committee Note on Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Report of Proposed Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 433, 483 n. 1 (1946), 
28 U.S.C.App., p. 637; Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 
346, 352, 101 S.Ct. 1146, 1150, 67 L.Ed.2d 287 (1981). The Rule 
prompts both parties to a suit to evaluate the risks and costs of 
litigation, and to balance them against the likelihood of success 
upon trial on the merits.92 
Testing that assumption, a study performed by Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve 
Rassenti, Daniel Simmons, and Erik Tallroth, evaluated the effects of increased litigation costs 
                                                          
91 FED. R. CIV. P. 68 
92 Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) 
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on settlements.93 Their empirical experiment with undergraduate students at George Mason 
University revealed that its subjects tended to behave as intended by the drafters of the FRCP. 
The higher the amount at risk (as if a party may have to bear both parties’ expenses) the more 
prone they were to settle the dispute. Accordingly, the overall settlement rate under low expected 
cost was 58.7% against 77.7% in high cost cases.94 This might suggest that Federal Rule 6895 
really promotes a higher compromise disposition by conditioning cost-shifting to the decline of 
an offer that is better to the oferee than the final trial outcome. However, most courts have not 
applied the cost-shifting provisions of Rule 6896 to attorney’s fees, “by far the most significant 
trial expenditure.” 97 Because settlement rates were higher before increased costs, Professor 
Inglis et al. propose a broader definition of “costs” for purposes of Rule 6898 so it also includes 
attorney’s fees.99 Therefore, the actual drawback of Rule 68100 would be that the courts have 
narrowly construed the term “costs incurred” so it usually does not include attorney’s fees.101 
                                                          
93 Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of 
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89 
(2005) 
94 Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of 
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 116 
(2005) 
95 FED. R. CIV. P. 68 
96 FED. R. CIV. P. 68 
97 Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of 
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 95 
(2005) (“In most instances, attorneys' fees, by far the most significant trial expenditure, are not recoverable under 
Rule 68”) (footnotes omitted); 
98 FED. R. CIV. P. 68 
99 Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of 
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 116 
(2005) (“This suggests that high court costs create strong incentives for settlement. One possible application of this 
result is to increase court costs by including attorneys' fees as recoverable costs in cost-shifting rules, such as Rule 
68 and section 998.”) 
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 68 
101 Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL 
L. REV. 357, 374-76 (2011) (“However, critics argue Rule 68 fails to provide a powerful incentive for parties to 
make and accept settlement offers because courts commonly interpret Rule 68's ambiguous language as not 
including attorneys' fees, which account for the majority of litigation expenses…. Several courts have refused to 
include attorney's fees in those costs subject to Rule 68's cost-shifting provision, even though the underlying 
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Whether the American rule fosters settlements or trials seems to depend on the 
parties’ expectations about the trial outcome.102 If there is uncertainty for both parties about the 
trial outcome, the American rule seems to promote more trials since the monetary risks to each 
party are limited to her own expenses. On the other hand, if the trial outcome is very predictable, 
the American rule should foster settlements because even the expected winner will prefer to 
settle in order to save the trial expenses. 103 
This seems to provide a good overview of the costs of American legal disputes 
and their interaction with the parties’ behavior towards settlement. The specific costs of 
discovery and civil jury trial, and their relationship with settlements will be analyzed in each 
topic bellow, respectively. 
III – Discovery and Civil Jury Trial Contributions to the High Percentage of Settlements in 
American Modern Civil Litigation 
A) Discovery. 
A.1. Pleadings and Discovery 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
substantive statute expressly described attorneys' fees as costs. Circuit courts have split on whether attorneys' fees 
are “subject to Rule 68's cost-shifting provisions.”) (footnotes omitted) 
102 David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the "American Rule" 
and "English Rule", 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 610 (2005) (“In the end, whether the ‘English rule’ 
decreases the frequency of settlements seems to turn on the parties' beliefs regarding the strength of their respective 
case.”) (footnote omitted) 
103 David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the "American Rule" 
and "English Rule", 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 609 (2005) (“To pose the argument in a slightly different 
manner, under the “American rule,” if both parties are certain of victory, they will still settle in cases where the cost 
of victory at trial is more than the cost of settling; whereas, the “English rule” would encourage the litigants to 
proceed to trial in order to have a full recovery in the case of the plaintiff, or no loss in the case of the defendant. 
Thus, one may conclude that “‘the likelihood of trial under the British system will be greater than under the 
American system.’”) (footnotes omitted) 
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During the nineteenth century, beginning with New York, and then followed by 
other states, the common law pleading system was changed in an effort to make it simpler for the 
parties.104 According to this new system, known as “code pleading,” because it was first drafted 
as the “Field Code” (New York) and followed by other state codes,105 the pleadings would 
perform a guiding role, shaping the case and establishing the controversy.106 In fact, the code 
formulation required litigants to bring “a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting 
each cause of action (defense or counterclaim) without unnecessary repetition.”107 The statement 
of the facts constituting each cause of action rather than the statement of the claim was essential.  
This approach had its critics who argued that the rigidity of pleadings rules would 
cause the parties to waste time and energy fighting on technical matters of procedure rather than 
on the underlying facts or merits.108 The critics were right as evidenced by the battle among 
lawyers, judges and doctrine to determine what should be the meaning of “facts” according to the 
Code. 109 Moreover, the courts could not draw a clear line between an “ultimate fact,” which was 
deemed indispensable to the claim, and an “evidentiary fact,” that should not be part of it.110 
                                                          
104 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 20 (Foundation Press, 2005) 
105 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 20 (Foundation Press, 2005) 
106 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 255 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 
2005)(“They argue that without a set of rules, rigidly applied, courts will be clogged with unjustified cases, some 
that never should have been brought, and some that cannot legitimately be defended. Trials that do take place will be 
sloppy affairs, admitting as evidence testimony that bears remotely at best on the true issues at stake.”) 
107 N.Y.LAWS 1851, c. 479, § 1. 
108 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 255 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 
2005) 
109 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 263 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 
2005) (“Nevertheless, goaded on by litigious attorneys, the courts turned the “fact” pleading requirement into a 
nightmare that in some jurisdiction all but destroyed the effectiveness of the reform.”) 
110, MARY JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 263 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 
2005); See also Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 57 (2010) (“One of the 
primary shortcomings of Code pleading was the distinction between ‘ultimate’ facts, which were required to be 
pleaded, and ‘evidentiary’ facts and ‘conclusions of law,’ which were not to be pleaded. Those distinctions proved 
unworkable in practice and resulted in a level of technicality and factual detail in the pleadings that became 
counterproductive.”) (footnotes omitted) 
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In response to the chaos associated with “code pleading,” the U.S. Supreme Court 
promulgated in 1938 a different pleading system which has become known as “notice 
pleading.”111 In fact, Federal Rule 8112 requires the parties to state “a short and plain statement of 
the claim” as opposed to the facts constituting each cause of action.113 Now, the standard 
required from the parties in federal court is no longer to state facts, but to state a claim, which 
means that the pleadings must just be clear enough to reveal the basic nature of the dispute.114 
This lower standard is also seen in the forms in the Appendix to the Rules. 
For many decades, the Supreme Court followed its precedent in Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41(1957), defining notice pleading as just a manner of giving fair notice of the 
pleader’s contentions to the adversary. In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court stated that 
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to 
set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the 
contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of the 
claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms 
appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this.115 
                                                          
111 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 267 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 
2005) 
112 FED. R. CIV. P. 8 
113 FED. R. CIV. P. 8 – “(a) CLAIM FOR RELIEF. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and 
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim 
needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of 
relief.” 
114 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002); 
115 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) 
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Recently, however, the Supreme Court has heightened the pleading 
requirements.116 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Court found that 
the alleged parallel conduct of different companies (with the possibility of discovering more 
relevant facts after discovery) was not enough to present a claim for conspiracy under antitrust 
law.117 The plaintiff should allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”118 Twombly created a plausibility test and an inquiry into the pleading’s convincingness.119 
After some uncertainty of its applicability beyond antitrust disputes, the Supreme Court, in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), made it clear that “[t]hough Twombly determined the 
sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and 
application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States District Courts.’”120 Despite these recent Supreme Court 
decisions, heightening the pleading requirements, their effects are still not fully understood.121 
However, it may be the change is minimal. First, but for civil rights cases, it has been reported 
that courts dismissal rates are practically the same as they were before Twombly and Iqbal.122 
Second, so far there has been no amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor to its 
forms. 
                                                          
116 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1930-31 (2009) 
117 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (“An allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a 
naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some 
further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitle[ment] to 
relief.’”) 
118 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (emphasis added) 
119 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1931-32 (2009) 
120 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) 
121 Charles B. Campbell, Elementary Pleading, 73 LA. L. REV. 325, 351 (2013) (“Not surprisingly, Twombly and 
Iqbal have triggered a wave of empirical studies attempting to quantify what, if any, impact the cases are having on 
civil litigation. So far, the results are conflicting and inconclusive.”) 
122 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1934 (2009); See also Joe S. 
Cecil, George W. Cort, Margaret S. Williams & Jared J. Bataillon, Motions to Dismiss for Failure to  
State a Claim After Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, vii (Mar., 2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf  (“There 
was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a motion to dismiss terminated the case…) 
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For this paper, it is important to highlight that notice pleading still requires a 
lower standard of fact presentation than code pleading. Besides, even after Twombly the pleading 
requirements still fall far from detailed factual allegation.123 In this scenario, without a strict fact 
pleading requirement and allowing the parties to plead according to the low standard of the 
simple “notice of a claim”, it was (and it still is) necessary to create other tools that narrow the 
controverted facts and issues subject to judgment. The broad rules of discovery in the FRCP fit 
this role.124 Because of the “notice pleading system,” discovery has as one of its main purposes 
to “ascertain the issues that actually are in controversy between the parties.”125 More than that, 
discovery, as conceived by the Federal Rules, is fundamental to the parties to delimit which facts 
are really in dispute.126 This relationship between notice pleading and discovery makes the latter 
essential to fostering settlement in American civil litigation. In fact, it is reasonable that 
knowledge of which facts are really in controversy is a premise for any meaningful discussion 
towards a consensual resolution of the dispute. 
A.2. Information Gained Through Discovery 
                                                          
123 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (“Here, in contrast, we do not require heightened fact 
pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the 
plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be 
dismissed.”) 
124 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“This simplified notice pleading standard relies on 
liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of 
unmeritorious claims.”); See also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 268 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 2005) (“The federal rules by formally including broad rules of discovery 
and an elaborate provision for summary judgment adequately filled any gap left by less stringent pleading 
requirements.”) (footnotes omitted). 
125 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 398 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 
2005); Also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (“The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a 
device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and 
(2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those 
issues. Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, 
consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts 
before trial.”) 
126 Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 58 (2010) (“In line with the ‘liberal ethos’ 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pleadings were designed to ensure that case-screening mechanisms were 
delayed until after some fact discovery.”) (footnotes omitted) 
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As pointed by Stephen Yeazell, 
Both state courts and the federal system have adopted broad civil 
discovery rules that permit a lawyer to uncover, in advance of trial, 
enormous amounts of information. The scope and depth of modern 
U.S. discovery practice make it unique among today’s legal 
systems. This scope permits the bringing and defense of claims 
where all or much of the relevant information lies in the possession 
of the other side.127 
According to the Federal Rules, parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense, even if the information 
sought is not admissible at trial but is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.128 In this context, the scope of discovery has been construed very broadly by the 
courts, as one should expect in a notice pleading system.129 In Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. 
Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978), the Supreme Court held that  
Consistently with the notice-pleading system established by the 
Rules, discovery is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for 
discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues. 
Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of 
                                                          
127 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 458 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) 
128 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); See Horizons Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421, 425 (1st Cir. 1961) (“Rule 
26(b) provides that the deponent may be examined ‘regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action….’ It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be 
inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.”)  
129 Horizons Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421, 425 (1st Cir. 1961) (“This rule apparently envisions 
generally unrestrictive access to sources of information, and the courts have so interpreted it.”) 
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fact-oriented issues may arise during litigation that are not related 
to the merits. 
On the other hand, a deeper reading of the Rules shows that there are some 
restrictions in scope, including: privileged information, material obtained in preparation for trial, 
and physical or mental examinations (except if there is a good cause and the physical or mental 
conditions are in controversy).130 Besides, the rules still demand some relevance regarding the 
sought information. For instance, in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court found that 
would be proper to deny discovery of matters that were relevant only to claims or defenses that 
have been stricken because discovery must be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.131 These limitations, however, are not significant on the broad sweep of 
discovery. 
The discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is initiated with the 
conference of the parties, which must be held as soon as practicable and at least 21 days before 
the initial pretrial conference.132 During this conference, the parties must consider the nature and 
basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the 
case.133 If settlement is not reached and the case proceeds, then the parties must develop a 
proposed discovery plan.134 Therefore, the first step of the federal discovery is to bring the 
parties together to make them better understand each pleading and to build a plan to discover the 
                                                          
130 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
119-20 (West, 3d ed. 2010) 
131 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1978) (“Discovery of matter not ‘reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ is not within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). Thus, it is proper 
to deny discovery of matter that is relevant only to claims or defenses that have been stricken, or to events that 
occurred before an applicable limitations period, unless the information sought is otherwise relevant to issues in the 
case.”) 
132 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1) 
133 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2) 
134 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2) 
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facts and evidence that support their cases. As a matter of fact, the conference also gives the 
parties a first impression of the strength and weakness of their pleadings and provides an 
opportunity to at least initiate a settlement discussion.135 
Within 14 days after this first conference,136 the FRCP state that a party must, 
without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties: 
(i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of 
each individual likely to have discoverable information—along 
with the subjects of that information—that the disclosing party 
may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be 
solely for impeachment; 
(ii) a copy—or a description by category and location—of all 
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things 
that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control 
and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would 
be solely for impeachment; 
(iii) a computation of each category of damages claimed by the 
disclosing party—who must also make available for inspection and 
copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary 
material, unless privileged or protected from disclosure, on which 
                                                          
135 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 474 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“The initial round 
of disclosures asks each party to put its basic evidentiary cards on the table. In the process it helps each lawyer form 
a general idea of the case he will be facing. That may produce settlement discussions, and it also gives a very 
general sneak preview of the main evidentiary attractions at summary judgment and trial.”) 
136 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C) 
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each computation is based, including materials bearing on the 
nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(iv) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34, any insurance 
agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to 
satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to 
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the 
judgment.137 
This mandatory initial disclosure was introduced as part of the discovery procedure by the 
drafters in 1993 and its purpose was “to accelerate the exchange of basic information about the 
case and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information….”138 Initial 
disclosure, thus, is another procedural discovery tool aimed to provide to the parties an early 
understanding about the facts and evidence that are going to support their claims, promoting an 
earlier disposition of civil cases, including through settlement.139 
Furthermore, according to the Federal Rules, the parties have six discovery 
devices: oral depositions, written depositions, interrogatories, production of documents and such, 
physical and mental examination, and requests for admission.140 Through these tools the parties 
may access practically all facts and evidence that are going to be used in an eventual trial. “Thus 
                                                          
137 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) 
138 NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (1993 amendment) 
139 Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and 
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 535 (1998) (“Far more 
attorneys reported that initial disclosure decreased litigation expense, time from filing to disposition, the amount of 
discovery, and the number of discovery disputes than said it increased them. At the same time, many more attorneys 
said initial disclosure increased overall procedural fairness, the fairness of the case outcome, and the prospects of 
settlement than said it decreased them.”) 
140 FED. R. CIV. P. 30, 31, 33, 34, 35 and 36; KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 69-74 
(Thomson West, 2d ed. 2009) 
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civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, 
consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of 
the issues and facts before trial.”141 Moreover, according to the Federal Rules the “[p]laintiff is 
as free to seek information relevant to a defense as he is to seek matter relevant to his or her own 
case.”142 
In this context, the first stage of discovery, the conference, gives both parties, at 
the beginning of the lawsuit, the opportunity to settle the case before further expenses are 
incurred. Furthermore, as discovery requests are satisfied litigants have the same information 
about each other, even unfavorable facts, giving them the same facts and evidence that are going 
to support an eventual trial. In other words, discovery puts the parties in a position of 
symmetrical information. Whether this equality in information fosters settlements is analyzed in 
the next section. 
A.3. Effects of Symmetrical Information on Settlements 
Initially, it is known that other factors besides pure economic efficiency may play 
a decisive role in a party’s choice to litigate a case instead of settling it. In fact, some parties may 
prefer to litigate their cases as a matter of strategy, as it happens with insurance companies trying 
to build a tough reputation,143 or with medical malpractice cases,144 where the doctors have a 
                                                          
141 Hickman v. Taylor 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) 
142 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
272-73 (West, 3d ed. 2010)  
143 Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 75, 80 (1993) (“Repeat players such as insurance companies may wish to develop reputations for 
litigating certain types of cases in order to increase their bargaining power in future cases, or to deter frivolous 
suits.”) 
144 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of 
Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 360 (1991) (“What does distinguish medical malpractice litigation is the 
proportion of zero offers. In other areas of personal injury litigation, the great majority of trials occur after the 
defendant has offered some settlement to the plaintiff. There were zero offers in only 15% of the vehicular 
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reputation to maintain, or when a new matter is posed to the court and there is a precedent to be 
created.145 In all these cases, even knowing that litigation is not economically viable, parties may 
still want to try cases. Moreover, behavioral characteristics may play a decisive role on 
settlement decision. Risk-averse parties are more willing to settle than risk-seeking ones. 
Humans subjectively value losses more than gains, even if the monetary amount at stake is 
exactly the same.146 These features bring a sort of variables to the parties’ negotiations, 
influencing their bargaining. However, this work focuses on an economic model for the civil 
settlements and, thus, the parties are considered neutral to any bargain tactics as to any litigation 
risks. It also assumes that the parties have symmetrical stakes. 
In this scenario, intuitively, there should be no reason for the parties to go to trial, 
increasing their costs even more, most with attorneys’ fees, if they are both aware of their real 
chances to succeed and to fail.147 In other words, if the parties decide to go on with the lawsuit 
wanting a judicial decision and paying more for that, probably it is because they have different 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
negligence cases, 20% of the nonvehicular negligence cases, and 21.6% of the products liability cases. But in 60% 
of the medical malpractice trials in our sample, defendants made no offer at all.”) (footnote omitted) 
145 Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 315, 323-24 (1999) (“A third model of case selection, less well known, focuses on the possibility of 
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the parties' stakes are unequal, those cases in which the outcome is disproportionately likely to favor the ‘repeat 
player,’ that is, the party with an interest in establishing a precedent.”) (footnotes omitted) 
146 John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1129, 1138 (2009) 
(“Jeff Rachlinski changed the standard economic literature on settlement by applying to it the findings of Kahneman 
and Tversky. Rachlinski's experiments indicated that when a settlement reflects the expected value of a lawsuit, 
plaintiffs will be far more likely to deem the settlement acceptable than will defendants. A likely explanation is that 
plaintiffs view the money as a gain whereas defendants view it as a loss. This makes the plaintiffs risk-averse, 
preferring a certain settlement to the risk of a trial; but it makes defendants risk-seeking, preferring a possible payout 
after adjudication to a certain but smaller one in settlement.”) (footnotes omitted) 
147 Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 315, 319 (1999) (“From an economic perspective, it is understandable why the vast majority of cases 
settle. The alternative to settlement is litigation, which is generally more expensive. By settling, the parties create a 
“surplus” (the aggregate of the amounts each would have spent to go to trial) that they can divide between them.”) 
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expectations about the outcome.148 This conclusion becomes even stronger due to the absence of 
a cost-shifting rule in the American civil litigation. In fact, no matter who wins, there would still 
be the unreimbursed cost of the litigation.149 In this context, from the time the lawsuit is filed, 
both parties are already losers. As a result, the longer it takes the dispute to end, the more both 
parties are losing since their expenses will not be reimbursed by the so-called loser. 
Given all the assumptions above, it is believed that once parties have the same 
expectations about the probable trial outcome they should prefer settlement rather than trial, 
since the longer it takes to reach the final resolution the more the parties are losing in judicial 
costs and attorney’s fees.150 On the other hand, different hopes regarding the future trial outcome 
would make them prefer to try cases. Hence, the important question is: what is it that makes the 
parties have the same or different expectations? The logical answer is information.151 One builds 
expectations based on what he/she knows about the facts playing a causation role in this 
cause/consequence model where the consequence is the outcome of the possible trial. In light of 
this reasonable and quite simple logic, the more the parties have the same information, the more 
                                                          
148 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,16 (1984) 
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150 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 541 (Little, Brown and Company, 4th ed.1992) (“Settlement 
out of court is cheaper than litigation. Therefore, only if each disputant expects to do better in the litigation than the 
other disputant expects him to do are the parties likely to fail to agree on settlement terms that make them both 
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151 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
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optimism.)  
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they are inclined to agree about the future outcome of the litigation.152 Once their expectations 
about the probable findings of the factfinder (no matter if a jury or a judge) are closely the same, 
their desire of reducing their losses by a faster and cheaper agreement should be stronger. 
Discovery allows the parties to learn about, prior to trial, all the information that 
each one is seeking to use in order to convince the factfinder about its rights, correcting false 
optimisms and approximating their expectations to the probable trial outcome. 153 Doing so, 
discovery makes parties willing to settle for the economic reasons set forth above. Thus, it might 
be said that “[t]he first purpose of discovery is to increase the probability of settlement. This 
purpose is achieved by enabling the parties in a dispute to pool information so as to predict the 
outcomes of a trial more accurately.”154 
In order to provide a framework that measures the effects of discovery over 
settlements, Cooter and Rubinfeld work with the optimism/pessimism dichotomy about trial 
outcomes.155 They set the premise that 
Optimism about trial will reduce the advantage that the parties 
perceive in settling. Relative optimism about trial exists when the 
judgment expected by the plaintiff exceeds the judgment expected 
by the defendant…. In order for settlement to be possible, the 
                                                          
152 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
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153 Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 442 
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savings in cost to the parties must exceed their relative optimism 
about trial….156 
Thus, the smaller the relative optimism the more likely the parties will settle. Since in an 
adversarial context in order for one be right the other must be wrong, it is fair to assume that 
“[w]hen the parties are both optimistic (relative to the expected outcome with complete 
information), at least one of them is uninformed.”157 Discovery fosters settlements by correcting 
false optimism and by reducing the variance in the parties’ expectations as to make litigation 
more expensive than settlement. 
An empirical study performed by Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, 
Daniel Simmons, and Erik Tallroth about how discovery affects settlements proves the above 
assumptions.158 Their experiment 
[M]odeled a lawsuit as a bargaining game between subjects 
interacting anonymously in the roles of plaintiff and defendant. 
The plaintiff initiated the suit by sending a compensation request to 
the defendant. The parties were then given a fixed period of time in 
which to negotiate a settlement. If they failed to reach an 
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agreement within that time, the court imposed a decision and both 
parties were required to pay court costs.159 
The subjects for the experiment were undergraduate students and received 
earnings based on their performance. In light of the empirical results, the study concluded that 
[S]ettlement rates declined as the difference between Min and Max 
[which were the lower and upper boundary for a court decision, 
respectively] increased. This may be due to the fact that when the 
difference between Min and Max is small, both parties have a high 
degree of certainty about the court outcome. Rational negotiators 
will therefore settle to avoid the court costs.160 
On the other hand, Cooter and Rubinfeld call the attention for a negative effect of 
discovery on settlements. Since pessimism about trial outcome would encourage the pessimist to 
settle, discovery that corrects a party’s pessimism should make her more willing to try the case. 
Therefore, discovery, by compelling the involuntary pooling of information, subtracts the 
informed party advantage over the uninformed one that could prejudice settlements.161 Although 
Cooter and Rubinfeld’s conclusions seem reasonable, the economic advantages of settlement 
under symmetry of information still remain. Moreover, discovery provides a safe harbor to 
                                                          
159 Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of 
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 98 
(2005) 
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parties averse to negotiate in the dark, protecting them from unfair agreements, without losing 
the economic incentives for settlements. 
In fact, the information symmetry granted by discovery fosters not only 
settlements, but also provides the grounds for an agreement closer to what a judicial decision 
would be. Since discovery allows the parties share all the evidence that would be presented at 
trial, their negotiation occurs on the same basis in which the judicial decision should be 
constructed. As a result, the settlement tends to reflect the outcome of a fully informed trial.162  
Furthermore, as pointed out by Bruce Hay, by admitting requests for even inadmissible materials 
(since it could lead to admissible evidence), discovery may lead the parties to discover evidence 
that otherwise would remain concealed at trial.163 Assuming that trial accuracy depends on the 
quantity of information available to the court, Hay concludes that discovery increases trial 
accuracy. Since symmetric information makes settlements reflect likely trial outcomes, by 
increasing trial accuracy discovery is also increasing settlement accuracy.164 
Therefore, settlements reached after full discovery should satisfy the efficiency 
aimed by Federal Rule 1,165 since they would secure a resolution that is, on the one hand, speedy 
and less expensive than trial and, on the other hand, as just as the likely outcome after trial. 
Supporting the discovery role in fair outcomes, whether by settlement or trial, Judith McKenna 
and Elizabeth Wiggins highlight the findings of the Columbia Project for Effective Justice, a 
project commissioned by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to conduct a field survey of 
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pretrial discovery in federal courts.166 The researches found that 78% of the lawyers said that 
discovery helped a just disposition of the litigation, instead of only 21% (mostly losers at trial) 
said it made no difference. 167 Thus, discovery increases the quantity and the quality of 
settlements. 
A.4. Effects of Discovery’s Costs on Settlements. 
As already discussed, parties may have asymmetry of information. This is a 
situation that can be fixed through discovery, encouraging the parties to settle for the economic 
reasons set forth above. Because full information settlements reflect full information trial 
outcomes, it is expected that settlements after discovery also should be as fair as a judicial 
decision. However, correcting this imbalance has a price, the discovery price. As pointed by 
Stephen Yeazell, “[g]ood data on the costs of discovery is hard to come by, but in some cases 
discovery will be a major expense. Worse, for a defendant who ultimately prevails, the costs of 
that discovery will sometimes represent the major cost of litigation.”168 
Judith McKenna and Elizabeth Wiggins did a detailed analysis for the Columbia 
Project for Effective Justice, a project commissioned by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
to conduct a field survey of pretrial discovery in federal courts.169 They pointed out the 
difficulties in studying discovery costs; in particular because of different attorney-fee 
arrangements, and variability on discovery costs depending on the type of case and party. 
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According to the Columbia Project findings, in antitrust actions, discovery represented 65% of 
plaintiffs’ costs and 63% of defendants’ costs, while in patent cases discovery represented 21% 
of plaintiffs’ costs and 54% of defendants’ costs.170 The authors also referred to some studies 
showing a relationship between discovery incidence and the stake at the center of the case: 
Glaser found that the incidence of discovery was related to 
attorneys' predictions of the amount that would be recovered. Only 
two-thirds of respondents who predicted recovery of $2500 or less 
used discovery, whereas 75% of those predicting recovery between 
$2500 and $40,000 used discovery, and 92% of respondents 
predicting recovery of more than $40,000 did so. In Walker's Iowa 
study, the volume of discovery was related to the amount in 
controversy--cases with more than twenty requests were more 
likely to be cases with higher amounts in controversy…. 
… Small-case attorneys used discovery less often and less 
intensively, devoted a lower percentage of total billable time to 
discovery than did large-case attorneys and committed higher 
percentages of their time to investigations, negotiations and 
trials. 171 
A more recent study commissioned by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
and conducted by Thomas Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard and Dean Miletich 
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(“Thomas Willging et al.”) found that 50% of the total cost of litigation reported by attorneys 
was due to discovery and that “the proportion of litigation costs spent on discovery differed little 
between plaintiffs and defendants.”172 Their analysis also confirms that the amount of discovery 
is proportional to the parties’ stake.173 However, the latest study commissioned by the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules showed a reduction of discovery cost percentage in relation to the 
total cost of litigation. Accordingly, “[t]he median estimate of the percentage of litigation costs 
incurred in discovery was 20 percent for plaintiffs and 27 percent for defendants.”174 
Discovery is an American creation related to the notice pleadings of American 
civil procedure. As set forth above, Federal Rule 8175 requires the parties state “a short and plain 
statement of the claim,” instead of “the facts that constitute each cause of action”, as “code 
pleading” did. Even after the Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007), heightened pleading requirements by creating the plausibility test and the 
inquiry into a pleading’s convincingness,176 notice pleading still is a low standard since the 
parties are not demanded to plead specific facts, “but only enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”177 In this context, discovery plays a fundamental role by revealing 
the facts that are necessary to the resolution of the dispute, since this function is no longer 
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performed by the pleadings. According to Thomas Willging et al., in a national survey “85% of 
the attorneys said some discovery had occurred in their case.”178  
To understand the cost of discovery is to understand the role and the cost of each 
of its devices. The Federal Rules provide for six discovery devices: oral depositions, written 
depositions, interrogatories, production of documents and tangible things, physical and mental 
examination, and requests for admission.179 Usually, the cheapest ones are interrogatories and 
requests for admission. On the other hand, the more expensive discovery devices are often 
written deposition, oral depositions and physical and mental examinations. Finally, production of 
documents might be cheap or expensive depending on the amount of documents requested and 
their availability. Recently, attention has been drawn to the high costs related to the production 
of documents in digital format. In light of so many devices, a recent Federal Judicial Center 
study found that the median time imposed for completion of discovery was six months.180   
Interrogatories are provided by Federal Rule 33,181 which allows each party to 
serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts, 
without leave of court.182 Since answering interrogatories do not require the presence of the 
submitting lawyer and are made and answered in writing, with no officer participation, they are 
the least expensive discovery device offered by FRCP.183 Not surprisingly, interrogatories have 
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been frequently used. According to Thomas Willging et al., 81% of the lawyers that reported 
some discovery activity said they engaged in interrogatories.184 However, because the questioner 
cannot follow up evasive answers, and because it allows the party to prepare answers to the 
questions asked, its usefulness is limited to identify other evidence related to the facts rather than 
to prove them.185 Hence, although interrogatories are far from being a relevant cost regarding 
discovery expenses, for most of the time they will not be enough to provide the sought after 
symmetry of information. 
Another inexpensive discovery device is the request for admission. Federal Rule 
36186 states that a party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of 
the pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of discovery relating to facts, 
the application of law to fact, or opinions about either, and the genuineness of any described 
documents.187 The cost for a request of admission is very low for the same reasons set forth 
above for interrogatories. Despite of being inexpensive, this specific device saves further 
discovery expense by severing the facts that are still in controversy from the ones that are not, 
saving investigation costs with the latter. In fact, “[t]he rule is intended to expedite the trial and 
to relieve the parties of the cost of proving facts that will not be disputed at trial, the truth of 
which is known to the parties or can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.”188 However, in a very 
controversial dispute, their utility is limited and they are not going to prevent the parties from 
incurring major discovery costs. 
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Among the most expensive discovery devices, the written deposition was first 
conceived as an alternative to the costs of oral deposition in situations such as when a deposed 
person is geographically distant from the deposing party.189 According to Federal Rule 31,190 a 
party may depose any person by written questions, including a party, without leave of court, 
except as provided in Rule 31(a)(2).191 The deposition will be taken by an officer who, after 
taking the deponent’s testimony will send it to the requesting party. The use of an officer of the 
court makes it a more expensive device than interrogatories. However, since a written deposition 
does not require the presence of the requesting party lawyer, it saves attorney’s fees when 
compared to oral deposition.192 Although written depositions were initially thought to be more 
convenient than oral depositions, because of the lower costs, only 2% of the cases use them, 
instead of a 49% use of oral deposition.193 The rare use of written deposition might be explained 
by its clear difficulties for deposing hostile or reluctant witness.194 But more important than the 
reasons for its infrequent use (compared to oral deposition) is the fact that since the cheapest 
deposition form is not commonly used, the average cost of discovery should increase. 
Physical and mental examinations are subject to the high costs usually involved in 
any expert evaluation. As consequence, the specific costs are going to depend on the complexity 
of the medical investigation allowed by the court. Rule 35195 has been read quite broadly and 
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courts have authorized examinations such as X-rays, electroencephalogram, electrocardiogram, 
urinalysis, ophthalmological examinations, examinations of the hymen, removal of part of the 
contents of the stomach for analysis, psychiatric and psychological examinations etc.196 
However, the Rules provide for some checks before a court issues an order for physical or 
mental examination. Basically, Federal Rule 35197 requires that the mental or physical condition 
is in controversy, and a showing of good cause made by the moving party.198 Assessing the 
latter, the judge will “balance the desire to insure the safety and freedom from pain of the party 
to be examined against the need for the facts in the interest of truth and justice.”199 Although the 
expense of the examination will be borne by the moving party, court scrutiny might at least save 
her from unnecessary discovery costs. On the other hand, the same court scrutiny may also cause 
unpredictable costs for the requesting party. In fact, Federal Rule 35200 does not secure to the 
moving party the absolute right to the choice of the physician and some courts advocate that the 
decision rests within the sound discretion of the court. 201 If the court appoints a professional 
other than the one sought by the requesting party, the cost of the examination might be different 
from that initially expected. 
Definitely, one of the most expensive discovery devices is the oral deposition. 
Federal Rule 30202 allows a party to depose any person by oral questions, including a party, 
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without leave of court except as provided in Rule 30(a)(2).203 Oral depositions are expensive 
because, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, they must be conducted before an officer 
appointed or designated under Rule 28.204 According to the California Civil Practice treatise, 
“[t]he largest single expense in employment litigation is typically the cost of deposition 
transcripts. At costs ranging from $500 to $1,000 per day of deposition testimony, it is readily 
apparent how these costs can quickly mount, particularly if there are numerous witnesses.”205 
Furthermore, both parties’ attorneys, and sometimes even the parties themselves, are going to be 
present during the deposition in order to participate in the examination and cross-examination of 
the deposed person.206 It means more billable hours with legal services and, sometimes, even 
costs related to attorney and party’s travels to different locations where the deposition may take 
place.207 Since Federal Rule 30208 provides each party ten depositions without leave of the court 
and each deposition may take one day of seven hours,209 each party may be threatened to spend 
70 hours of legal services with adverse party’s depositions. And the expenses still go on. 
Although is not required by Federal Rules, it is wise to prepare a witness to testify at a 
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should be deposed to preserve their testimony for introduction at trial…. Geographical considerations can augment 
the cost of depositions substantially. Particularly with larger companies, the employer may have its headquarters or 
significant operating offices in distant parts of the state, or out of state. The relevant decision-maker who 
implemented the decision leading to the adverse action may be based in any city in any state. When this occurs, the 
plaintiff should expect to pay a substantial amount to cover the costs of travel to take these important depositions.”) 
208 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(2)(A)(i) 
209 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1) 
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deposition.210 This increases even more the oral deposition costs with attorney’s fees and, 
consequently, with discovery. Despite of the high discovery costs related to oral depositions, 
Thomas Willging et al. note that it is still one of the most used devices, with 67% of the lawyers 
that engaged in formal discovery using them.211 
The last discovery device is the production of documents. Federal Rule 34212 
provides that a party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b) to 
produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the 
appointed items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control, and to permit entry 
onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding party, so that 
the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property or 
any designated object or operation on it.213 According to Thomas Williginig et al., it is the most 
frequently discovery device used by attorneys and “the activity for which the highest percentage 
of attorneys reported problems in their case.”214 Despite of this, the anecdotal information that 
production of document is one of the most costly parts of discovery is not true, since it consumes 
less than one third of the attorney’s costs with depositions.215 
Giving a good overview about how discovery activities relate to total litigation 
costs and case duration, Thomas Willging et al. state that 
                                                          
210  8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
452 (West, 3d ed. 2010) (“Moreover, a party ordinarily had no duty to prepare a witness to testify at a deposition, 
although tactical and other reasons usually prompted parties to prepare their witnesses.”) 
211 Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and 
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 530 (1998) 
212 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 
213 FED. R. CIV. P 34(a) 
214 Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and 
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 540 (1998) 
215 Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and 
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 540 (1998) 
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Depositions accounted for by far the greatest 
amount of discovery expense that flows through the attorney 
(median=$3500 in cases with depositions). The next most costly 
types of discovery were expert disclosure and discovery (median= 
$1375), document production (median=$1100), and interrogatories 
(median=$1000). Less expense was incurred by initial disclosure 
(median=$750) and meeting and conferring/discovery planning 
(median=$600). 
Document production, often said to be the most 
burdensome and costly part of discovery, typically involved rather 
modest costs, at least in regard to costs that flow through the 
attorney. 
We examined the relationship between the above 
discovery activities and litigation cost and time, and we found that 
total hours spent in depositions is strongly correlated with the total 
cost of litigation. We also found that as the percentage of total 
costs attributable to document production increases, total litigation 
costs also increase. 
Looking at the relationship between discovery 
activities and the duration of the litigation, we found that as the 
percentage of total costs attributable to depositions increased so 
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did case duration. On the other hand, when initial disclosure was 
used, case duration was shorter.216 
Because discovery has a cost, a party wanting to settle a case may face the 
following dilemma: whether to settle a case when it is likely that asymmetric information exists, 
but saving discovery costs, or to settle it later, after costly discovery.217 Keeping the same 
premises already established (that parties are neutral to any bargaining tactics as to any litigation 
risks and have symmetrical stakes) a party will settle a case whenever her perspective of 
discovery cost is bigger than her settlement cost. Therefore, discovery cost may also foster 
settlements. 
The price of discovery and its influence on a party’s will towards settlement 
might be one of the reasons for the success of the so-called “settlement mills.” Nora Freeman 
Engstrom defines settlement mills as law firms “on the far end of a continuum of contemporary 
personal injury practice, [that] advertise aggressively and settle what are usually low-stakes 
personal injury claims in high volumes, typically with little attorney-client interaction and 
without initiating lawsuits--much less taking claims to trial.”218 Their existence is due to its 
savings in transaction costs, including discovery costs, since, as they file far less lawsuits than 
other personal injury practitioners, court costs, deposition costs, expert witness fees and 
                                                          
216 Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and 
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 540 (1998) 
217 Warren F. Schwartz & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Credible Discovery, Settlement, and Negative Expected Value 
Suits, 40 RAND. J. ECON. 636, 637 (2009) (“That said, discovery, like trial itself, is costly, providing both sides an 
incentive to settle prior to incurring these costs. Thus, although discovery might have the potential to greatly reduce 
or eliminate much informational asymmetry in pretrial settlement bargaining, its cost suggests that, at least in some 
cases, the parties might prefer to settle under conditions of asymmetric information rather than incur discovery 
costs.”) 
218 Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 807 (2011) 
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attorney’s expenses are not incurred.219 These reduced costs added to the small claim size make 
settlements relatively certain for settlement mills because it is cheaper for the insurer to pay 
something instead of contesting liability.220 
However, the most recent discussions regarding the economic burdens of 
discovery have been focused on the costs of producing electronically stored information (ESI). 
The last Federal Judicial Center study regarding the costs of civil litigation showed that 
“[r]espondents reported a request for production of ESI in 30 to 40 percent of cases with any 
discovery.”221 It also found that the median costs were higher when electronic discovery was 
requested.222 Discussing this new reality, John Beisner points out that electronic discovery has 
significantly increased the cost of discovery since 99% of the world’s information is now 
generated electronically with the average employee sending or receiving 135 emails each day, 
and approximately 36.5 trillion emails sent worldwide every year.223 According to him,  
The harsh reality is that the costs of producing electronic 
documents far exceed those of producing paper documents. Unlike 
paper documents, electronic data must be processed and loaded 
into a special database before they can even be reviewed for 
potential relevance…. 
…. 
                                                          
219 Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 824-25 (2011) 
220 Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 827-28 (2011) 
221 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 1 (Oct., 2009), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf  
222 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 2 (Oct., 2009), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf 
223 John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 
564 (2010) 
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… One expert estimates the cost of producing a single electronic 
document to be as high as $4. Verizon, which has devoted 
considerable attention to electronic discovery issues, has estimated 
that producing one gigabyte of data--the equivalent of between 
15,477 and 677,963 printed pages--costs between $5,000 and 
$7,000. But far more than a single gigabyte of data will often be at 
issue. Commentators opine that even a typical midsize case now 
involves at least 500 gigabytes of data, resulting in costs of $2.5 to 
$3.5 million for electronic discovery alone. Another study found 
that from 2006 to 2008, the average surveyed company spent 
between $621,880 and $2,993,567 per case on electronic 
discovery. At the high end, companies in the study reported 
average per-case discovery costs ranging from $2,354,868 to 
$9,759,900.224 
In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, an employment 
discrimination discharge case where the employer (UBS) was accused of spoliation  of evidence, 
UBS sustained that the cost of producing e-mails on backup tapes would be prohibitive to most 
litigants (estimated at the time at approximately $300,000.00).225 In a copyright infringement 
lawsuit, the software company Oracle requested electronic discovery that would cost $16.5 
                                                          
224 John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 
565-67 (2010) (footnotes omitted) 
225 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“UBS, however, produced no additional 
e-mails and insisted that its initial production (the 100 pages of e-mails) was complete. As UBS's opposition to the 
instant motion makes clear—although it remains unsaid—UBS never searched for responsive e-mails on any of its 
backup tapes. To the contrary, UBS informed Zubulake that the cost of producing e-mails on backup tapes would be 
prohibitive (estimated at the time at approximately $300,000.00).”) 
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million to the adverse party and would take one year to be produced.226 Those cases might 
represent the far edge of the electronic discovery cost, but still they show the potential burdens of 
discovery, especially on corporate defendants. 227 Those figures highlight the pressures toward 
settlements not just within good-faith scenarios, where a thorough investigation may cost more to 
the party than to settle a close case, but also within bad-faith situations where discovery abuses, 
especially against corporate defendants, may force a party to settle unmeritorious claims.228 
Although this situation might threaten the fairness goal sought by Federal Rule 
1,229 from a pure economic standpoint, claims, whether meritorious or unmeritorious, may settle 
only because discovery costs are higher than the opposing party’s offer. As explained by Edward 
Cooper, 
We believe, and have been given an elegant model to demonstrate, 
that discovery can promote settlement. We know it can often 
increase delay and expense. We cannot really know whether the 
present system achieves a better blend of cost with justice by 
judgment and settlement than might be achieved by a dramatically 
                                                          
226 Order Re Scope of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, Courts Ruling and Orders, TN LAWSUIT 
INFORMATION (July 03, 2008), 
http://www.tnlawsuit.com/uploads/Order%20Re%20Scope%20of%20Discovery%20of%20Electronically%20Store
d%20Information.pdf  
227 John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 
574 (2010) (“The unchecked rise in discovery costs has attracted the attention of corporations, which now list 
discovery as one of their most pressing concerns when litigation is imminent. This concern is well founded. 
Discovery costs in U.S. commercial litigation are growing at an explosive rate; estimates indicate they reached $700 
million in 2004, $1.8 billion in 2006, and $2.9 billion in 2007. And these figures do not even account for the billions 
of dollars that corporations pay each year to settle frivolous lawsuits because the burdens of litigating until summary 
judgment or a favorable verdict are too onerous.”) (footnotes omitted) 
228 John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 
563 (2010)  (“Moreover, difficulties in managing and organizing electronic data have created opportunities for 
significant discovery abuse by litigants who see an opportunity to increase their opponents' costs and thereby force a 
settlement of litigation regardless of merit. These developments have pushed discovery to the forefront of litigation 
concerns for American businesses.”) 
229 F. R. CIV. P 1 
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different system. A system with no discovery, more trials, and less 
settlement might be better. Most reform discussion, however, is set 
in the framework of more modest proposals. Proposals to shift the 
costs of discovery fit into this mold.230 
In fact, the party’s dilemma (whether to settle when it is likely that asymmetric 
information exists, but saving discovery costs, or to settle it later, after costly discovery) would 
be lesser if the system provided for cost-shifting, making the requesting party or the trial loser 
bear the economic burden of the information discovered.231 Federal Rule 26232 seems to offer 
that alternative. According to it, the court may make any order which justice requires protecting 
a party from undue burden or expense that might include shifting the economic burden of 
discovery.233 In Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978), the Supreme 
Court held that 
[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the 
expense of complying with discovery requests, but he may invoke 
the district court's discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders 
protecting him from “undue burden or expense” in doing so, 
                                                          
230 Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 465 
(1994) 
231 John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 
587 (2010) (“The American rule is perhaps the greatest single catalyst of discovery abuse, because it allows 
plaintiffs to impose tremendous costs on defendants at virtually no cost to themselves. The perverse incentives to 
which the American rule gives rise have been exacerbated considerably in recent years by the rising costs associated 
with electronic discovery. The American rule also encourages fishing expeditions because nothing dissuades 
plaintiffs from requesting virtually limitless volumes of documents and evidence. In addition, the American rule 
contributes to excessive discovery by encouraging parties to request information and documents from opposing 
parties rather than undertaking their own investigative efforts.”) (footnotes omitted) 
232 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 
233 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) 
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including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party's 
payment of the costs of discovery. 
However, despite of that decision, courts are still hesitant to shift the discovery cost burden.234 In 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) a high cost-shifting standard 
for e-discovery was set and has been widely followed by the courts.235 Accordingly, “[f]or data 
that is kept in an accessible format, the usual rules of discovery apply: the responding party 
should pay the costs of producing responsive data. A court should consider cost-shifting only 
when electronic data is relatively inaccessible, such as in backup tapes.”236 Another solution that 
has been proposed in order to reduce the economic burdens of discovery (that was also used in 
Zubulake)237 is the “sampling practice.”238 That practice is usually adopted to permit the 
restoring of a sample of backup tapes that could show the potential for relevant material. Based 
on a sample, the court would be able to better asses cost-shifting and balance the cost of 
production and the relevance of the information.239 However, because courts are still reluctant to 
                                                          
234 Corinne L. Giacobbe, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of 
Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 269 (2000) (“Although Rule 26(c) seems to 
provide a solution to the problem of discovery abuse surrounding requests for electronically stored data, courts have 
been extremely hesitant to exercise the discretion that this burden-shifting rule affords them. In the few cases that 
involve requests to shift the burden of cost to the requesting party, the courts have varied greatly in their reasoning, 
considering many different factors and emphasizing distinct considerations. Thus, it is uncertain what conditions 
must be present in order for a court to find a discovery request for electronically stored data unduly burdensome or 
expensive.”) (footnotes omitted) 
235 Andrew Mast, Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining Zubulake and 28 U.S.C. S 1920, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 
1825, 1829 (2010) (“The Zubulake approach to cost-shifting is widely followed by the courts, but some 
commentators have criticized it as unduly restrictive, particularly with respect to its absolute ‘inaccessibility’ 
requirement. This Note joins in that criticism, and proposes new solutions.”) (footnotes omitted) 
236 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
237 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Second, because the cost-shifting 
analysis is so fact-intensive, it is necessary to determine what data may be found on the inaccessible media. 
Requiring the responding party to restore and produce responsive documents from a small sample of the requested 
backup tapes is a sensible approach in most cases.”) 
238 Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling Practice and the Resolution of 
Discovery Disputes in an Age of Ever-Increasing Information, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 719 (2012) 
239 Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling Practice and the Resolution of 
Discovery Disputes in an Age of Ever-Increasing Information, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 733-36 (2012) (analyzing 
the origins of sampling) 
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apply discovery cost-shifting,240 and since “the ways in which sampling has been implemented 
have been inconsistent across courts…,”241 discovery costs still present significant pressure on 
parties towards settlement. 
B) American Civil Jury System and Settlements. 
B.1. The Right to a Civil Jury Trial and Its Origins. 
A very unique characteristic of the American civil system is the jury trial.242 The 
jury system for civil litigation is a constitutional right of the American people in the federal 
courts provided by Seventh Amendment which states that  
In Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law.243 
Although the Seventh Amendment has not been extended to the states,244 the right to a jury trial 
is present in almost every state constitution.245 
                                                          
240 Andrew Mast, Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining Zubulake and 28 U.S.C. S 1920, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 
1825, 1826 (2010) (“A longstanding presumption in discovery is that the responding party bears its own costs 
incurred in responding to discovery requests.”) (footnotes omitted) 
241 Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling Practice and the Resolution of 
Discovery Disputes in an Age of Ever-Increasing Information, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 736 (2012) 
242 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 608 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“The civil trial 
jury flourishes only in the United States. Although we inherited the institution from English law, it is available there 
only in a few specialized cases (for example, in libel actions).”)  
243 U.S Const. amend. VII 
244 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 508 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 
2005) (“[E]ven though the right guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment has deep historical roots and is part of the 
foundation of the federal-court system, as evidenced by its inclusion in the Bill of Rights, it has not been made 
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As one may realize from the constitutional text, civil juries are for suits at 
common law, as opposed to suits at equity which, by the time the amendment was written, were 
reserved to the Courts of Chancery.246 The dual system of courts was an English legacy for the 
American colonies at the dawn of the United States.247 Nowadays, the courts of Equity no longer 
exist at the Federal judicial system as well as at most state judicial systems. However, for 
purposes of whether a party has a right to jury trial the distinction between claims at law and 
claims at equity still remains. 248  In fact, “the courts adopted a historical test for deciding the 
right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. Under the historical test, courts seek to give 
parties the same right of jury trial as they had in 1791.”249 
Most of the claims can be easily traced to well-established historical patterns.250 
The challenge is how to classify new claims and procedures that did not exist by the time of the 
Seventh Amendment.251 In Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 
558, the Supreme Court gave some guidance to the courts, stating that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
binding on the states through the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as have many other provisions in 
the first ten amendments of the Constitution.”) 
245 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 507 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 
2005) (“A similar guarantee can be found in nearly every state constitution”) (footnote omitted) 
246 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 610 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“Presumably, the 
drafters of the Seventh Amendment were thinking of a world in which there were separate courts of law and equity, 
a world in which one could only ‘preserve’ a right to jury trial in suits at common law. Because there had never been 
a right to jury trial in equity, there was nothing to preserve and no right to jury trial”) 
247 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 609 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“The English 
judicial system, whose organization was echoed by colonial courts in the period immediately before the Revolution, 
was divided into several jurisdictions.”) 
248 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 541 (Thomson West, 4th  ed. 
2005) (“Since most state constitutional provisions describe the jury-trial right in terms of the same law/equity 
distinction embodied in the Seventh Amendment, many of the same problems of applying the historical test under a 
merged procedural system arise in the state courts.”) 
249 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 610 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) 
250 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 611 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) 
251 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 612 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“Knottier 
problems emerge when one considers claims that did not exist at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, often those 
created by statute”) 
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To determine whether a particular action will resolve legal 
rights, we examine both the nature of the issues involved and the 
remedy sought. “First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-
century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the 
merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the 
remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in 
nature.” Tull, supra, 481 U.S., at 417-418, 107 S.Ct., at 1835-1836 
(citations omitted). The second inquiry is the more important in 
our analysis. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42, 
109 S.Ct. 2782, 2790, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989). 
An action for breach of a union's duty of fair representation 
was unknown in 18th-century England; in fact, collective 
bargaining was unlawful. See N. Citrine, Trade Union Law 4-7 (2d 
ed. 1960). We must therefore look for an analogous cause of action 
that existed in the 18th century to determine whether the nature of 
this duty of fair representation suit is legal or equitable.252 
Despite of this challenging constitutional test provided by the Supreme Court, it is 
important to note that Congress may guarantee jury trial to claims that otherwise should not be 
entitled to it. In fact, since there is no constitutional right to nonjury trial in the federal-court 
system, there is no obstacle to a statute that provides for trial by jury.253 Moreover, although a 
                                                          
252 Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565-66 (1990) 
253 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 517-18 (Thomson West, 4th 
ed. 2005) (“Because there is no constitutional right to nonjury trial in the federal-court system, nothing in the 
Seventh Amendment or in Article III precludes Congress from extending jury trial to non-common law actions.”) 
(footnote omitted) 
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constitutional guarantee, the right to a jury trial can be waived. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
38 provides that a party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed 
according to the terms of subsection (b) and (c).254  
Trials by jury in state courts are far more common than bench trials. According to 
a civil justice survey of state courts, jury trials accounted for almost 70% of the general civil 
trials disposed in 2005.255 However, the same survey also showed that, as opposed to civil trials 
involving tort claims, 90% of which were heard before a jury, “[j]udges decided a greater 
percentage of business-related civil trials – contract (64%) and real property (74%) cases – than 
juries.” 256 Moreover, “[l]itigants waived their rights to a jury trial and had their cases decided by 
a judge in more than 80% of contract cases involving seller plaintiff, mortgage, foreclosure, 
rental lease agreement, and subrogation issues.”257 Thus, the party’s wish of exercising her right 
to a jury trial clearly varies according to the type of case. 
  Although a constitutional right, jury trials have been long criticized. Usually the 
critics focus on two issues: the unpredictability (and even the unfairness) of a decision given by a 
group of lay people; and the costs naturally involved in a jury trial.258 The next sections will 
discuss how these jury features (unpredictability and cost) may affect settlements in the modern 
American civil litigation. 
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255 Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 1 (Oct., 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf 
256 Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
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257 Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
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258 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 508 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 
2005) (“The principal lines of attack on jury trial divide along two axes. The first challenges the basic unfairness and 
inefficiency of trial by a group of citizens unskilled in the application of frequently particularized and difficult legal 
concepts; the second is concerned with the cost to the judicial system caused by the delays inherent in the jury 
process.”) 
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B.2. Jury Unpredictability and Settlements. 
Trials are unpredictable. That seems to be the core of Samuel Gross and Kent 
Syverud advice: 
Anticipate problems and avoid conflicts; if conflicts arise, resolve 
them privately; if at all possible, do not sue. And when lawsuits are 
filed, this advice is transformed into the mantra of the judge: 
Settle. Every day, in countless settlement conferences, trial judges 
retail [sic] their own versions of Learned Hand’s wisdom: 
“They’re offering you $70,000.00. A jury could give you 
$150,000.00, but I’ve seen folks just like you come up empty, lots 
of times. If it were me, I’d be scared; I’d take it.”259 
Pointing out the same unpredictability, Nora Engstrom states that “it is true that the tort system is 
known to compensate claimants with similar injuries quite differently.”260 Thus, it seems there is 
no doubt that trials are unpredictable. 
A traditional explanation for that unpredictability is that cases that go to trial are 
the close ones.261 In fact, if the parties are always looking for the best cost/benefit relationship, 
                                                          
259 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 64 (1996) 
260 Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 827 (2011) 
261 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1965 (2009) (“More specifically, 
disputes and cases that clearly favor either the plaintiff or the defendant tend to settle readily, because both sides can 
save costs by settling in light of their knowledge of the applicable law and all other aspects of the case. Difficult 
cases falling close to the applicable decisional criterion tend not to settle, because the parties are more likely to 
disagree substantially in their predicted outcomes. These unsettled close cases fall more or less equally on either side 
of the criterion, regardless of the position of that criterion and regardless of the underlying distribution of disputes. 
Thus, even if, say, a legal criterion such as strict liability highly favors plaintiffs, one might not observe a plaintiff 
win rate well above 50%. Instead, case selection will leave for adjudication a residue of unsettled close cases, which 
consequently exhibit some nonextreme equilibrium win rate.”) 
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no defendant should try a case, adding to its costs, mostly with attorney’s fees, if she knows she 
is going to lose it. On the other hand, the lack of a cost-shifting rule makes it interesting for the 
plaintiff to settle a dispute whenever the difference between the defendant’s proposal and the 
jury’s expected award is less than the trial costs. That is why according to Samuel Gross and 
Kent Syverud, in a study performed with cases that actually went to trial in California Superior 
Courts, “[t]hose law suits that are fought to the end are indeed risky, costly and unpredictable.” 
The question is whether this unpredictability would be lower if the trial was held by a judge 
instead of a jury. 
Whatever the answer for that question might be, parties and lawyers seem to have 
their own perception that juries are more unpredictable than judges.262 Samuel Gross and Kent 
Syverud’s advice rendered above seems to agree with that, since it portrays the unpredictability 
of a jury’s decision. Following the same path, Charles D. Gill, Jr., Joseph A. Santos, and Curtiss 
L. Isler state that among the noted advantages of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) it is the 
“avoidance of volatile and unpredictable jury awards.”263 Professor Dru Stevenson remembers 
that the Founders inadvertently introduced the jury unpredictability into the legal system when 
trying to dilute state power.264 Accordingly, 
                                                          
262 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1964 (2009) (“Despite the 
research that rebuts stereotypes about juries, every day lawyers and policymakers act on the basis of those old 
stereotypes…. On the particular subject of jury/judge performance, elitist perceptions of a biased and incompetent 
jury system seem to conform to the natural order of things and can even be comforting.”) 
263 Charles D. Gill, Jr., Joseph A. Santos & Curtiss L. Isler, 1 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND 
OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 2:41 (West, 2012) (“The noted advantages of ADR include, but are not limited to, reduction in 
expenses, savings in time, retention of control of the decision-making process, preservation of business 
relationships, and avoidance of volatile and unpredictable jury awards.”) 
264 Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty Within Jury Systems, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 513, 514-15 (2012) 
(“Modern American juries are smaller and yield the opposite effect—individual juries can be quirky, with plumbers 
comprising the majority in one case and stockbrokers in the next. The hours or days of jury deliberation can 
introduce ridiculous groupthink problems, but the inconsistent results from case to case stabilize the overall legal 
system, making it less susceptible to headlong movements in bad directions. The Founders, who worried more about 
concentrations of power in the overall system than about corruption on the incidental level, inadvertently injected 
this unpredictability into the legal regime.”) (footnote omitted) 
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The variation among petit juries means that the 
results of any given case are not guaranteed—a good result is not a 
certainty, but neither will the results be consistently bad—and the 
Framers understood tyranny, it seems, in terms of consistently 
oppressive results. They also understood that government could 
naturally become tyrannical without safeguards, so it seems 
reasonable to presume that they designed their jury system to 
include such mechanisms.265 
The reasons for the public perception that juries are the “least predictable of the 
decision makers in the legal system”266 are quite known. First, judges are easier to be identified 
than jurors whose identities are unknown until the jury-selection process.267 As consequence, it 
is easier to assess a judge’s history, her rulings, prior relationships and experiences.268 Second, 
judges are experienced practitioners, whose decisions are deemed to be very rational, as opposed 
to jurors that are presumed to decide based on intuitions, personal biases, and values.269 
                                                          
265 Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty Within Jury Systems, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 513, 528 (2012) 
266 Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 375 (2011) 
267 Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377 (2011) (“After 
the case assignment and sometimes even before, the identity of the judge who will preside over a trial is known…. 
[On the other hand] [e]ven if the general tendencies of a jury pool are known through a lawyer's or litigant's prior 
experiences or a trial consultant's systematic information, the identity of the individual jurors will only be 
determined at the start of the trial during the jury-selection process.”) 
268 Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377 (2011) (“The 
judge's previous history, rulings in similar cases, and prior relationships and experiences all offer some information 
(whether it is useful or not) about how the judge might decide an upcoming case. None of that is known for certain 
before a jury trial.”) 
269 Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377-78 (2011) 
(“Another source of the greater perceived unpredictability of juries compared to judges is that jurors are widely 
presumed to rely on their intuitions, personal biases, and values. In contrast, judicial decision making is said to be 
characterized by a rational approach. However, judges are subject to many of the same psychological tendencies that 
influence laypeople. Nonetheless, because of their insider positions, judges may already possess or may be able to 
obtain information about typical trial outcomes and going rates in particular jurisdictions. This ability to gather 
comparative information about other cases might lessen the likelihood of judicial variability, especially compared to 
juries who are left in the dark about so many things, including the going rate for particular injuries and even whether 
the state imposes caps or other limits on damage awards.”) (footnotes omitted) 
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Studies, however, have demonstrated that “[j]udges and juries are in fact not so 
different.”270 According to Kevin Clermont, the classic work of Professors Harry Kaven and 
Hans Ziesel during the 1950s found a 78% agreement between judge and jury on liability 
issues.271 That finding is remarkable because: 
When compared to other human decisionmakers, 
this 78% agreement rate proves better than the rate of agreement 
on dichotomous decisions between scientists doing peer review, 
employment interviewers ranking applicants, and physicians 
diagnosing patients, and almost as good as the 79% or 80% rate of 
agreement between judges themselves making sentencing 
decisions on custody or no custody in an experimental setting.272 
Professors Valerie Hans and Theodore Eisenberg also state that “when scholars have compared 
the decision making of juries and judges, and other decision makers, the overall patterns appear 
more similar than different.”273 These findings show that, since discovery has already uncovered 
those cases with clear outcomes, allowing for them to settle earlier on (for the economic reasons 
set forth above) the cases that go to trial are the ones which outcome is difficult to predict, no 
matter who decides them.274 
                                                          
270 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1963 (2009) 
271 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1961 (2009) (“The classic work 
on jury and judge differences was by Professors Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel. They addressed the reliability (the 
ability to treat like cases alike) of jury decisionmaking, as opposed to validity (correctness). Their questionnaires to 
presiding judges in some 4000 actual state and federal civil jury trials nationwide in the 1950s--asking the judges 
how they would decide those same cases, a decision supposedly formulated before the verdict but reported 
afterwards--yielded data showing a 78% agreement between judge and jury on liability.”) (footnotes omitted) 
272 Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1961 (2009) 
273 Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 379 (2011) 
274 Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 376 (2011) 
(“Theorizing about what cases settle and what cases go to trial, many scholars conclude that the large majority of 
cases with clear outcomes will settle, leaving the most ambiguous cases for trial. This subset of ambiguous cases is 
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  Nevertheless, for purpose of settlements, more important than the truth about the 
jury’s unpredictability is the perception parties have about it. Parties make their decisions to 
settle or not a case based on their expectations about the trial outcome. Even if parties 
misperceive jury’s unpredictability, their perception directly impacts their trial expectations and, 
as consequence, their will to settle or not a case.275 In this context, for purposes of settlements, 
what really matters is how parties perceive jury’s unpredictability. Dru Stevenson holds that 
“[j]ury predictability is directly proportional to the likelihood of settlement; when the parties are 
uncertain about what the jury might decide, they are less likely to agree to a settlement, 
preferring to take their chances.”276 This conclusion seems to be in harmony with the economic 
model of civil litigation. In fact, parties settle based on their trial expectations, so they can save 
trial costs. 277 If the decision is unpredictable, parties are less prone to converge about the likely 
outcome of the case.278 Therefore, uncertainty about trial outcome prejudices the parties’ 
economic incentives to settle the dispute, decreasing the settlement rates.279 
On the other hand, it must be noted that many parties and lawyers refer to jury 
unpredictability meaning, actually, that juries are biased towards one of the parties, what makes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the group of cases that juries decide. The outcomes of these cases might be difficult to predict, no matter who 
decides them. Before the trial, some uncertainty about a case's eventual outcome will be present regardless of which 
decision maker is used.”) (footnote omitted) 
275 Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 813, 816 (2000) (“Bench trials' influence on settlement rates flows from the assumption that they generate 
more predictable outcomes than jury trials. Increased predictability in trial outcomes increases parties' information. 
Increased information about trial outcomes ex ante should stimulate more efficient negotiating and fuel case 
settlement rates.”) (footnotes omitted) 
276 Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty Within Jury Systems, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 513, 532 (2012) 
277 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 555 (Little, Brown and Company, 4th ed.1992) (“Each 
party’s best settlement offer will depend on how he expects to fare in litigation.”) 
278 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 541 (Little, Brown and Company, 4th ed.1992) (“Settlement 
out of court is cheaper than litigation. Therefore, only if each disputant expects to do better in the litigation than the 
other disputant expects him to do are the parties likely to fail to agree on settlement terms that make them both 
consider themselves better off compared with how they anticipate faring in litigation. Uncertainty is a necessary 
condition of such a divergence of estimates.”) (footnote omitted) 
279 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 554-560 (Little, Brown and Company, 4th ed.1992) 
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them more predictable than unpredictable.280 In fact, according to Kevin Clermont, “Tort 
reformers and others portray juries as having a pro-plaintiff bias. Juries are believed to find 
liability when judges would not, to grant higher awards than judges, and to grant inappropriate 
punitive damages awards.”281 Since this perception also changes the parties’ predictions about 
potential trial outcomes, it also affects settlements. However, different from what happens when 
the parties perceive juries as real unpredictable decisionmakers, the perception of juries as biased 
factfinders tends to elevate the settlement rates.282 In fact, since parties realize that the jury is 
more prone to a party than to another, they should “adjust their settlement behavior to account 
for the increased value of the plaintiff’s claim.”283 That seems to be the case with punitive 
damages. Especially regarding tort cases, where the punitive damage shadow is always present, 
the “unpredictability” (understood as a pro-plaintiff bias) of a jury punitive damage award has a 
decisive role in the defendant’s wish for settling the dispute.284 
Here, again, the parties’ perception might be disconnected from the reality.285 In 
fact, according to a civil justice survey of state courts, the percentage of litigants awarded 
                                                          
280 Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 378-79 (2011) 
(“Finally, we also have to acknowledge that when a lawyer complains about the unpredictability of juries, he or she 
might not be talking about predictability at all. Instead, the lawyer might be saying that juries are unfair and reach 
decisions against them all too often--in fact, all too predictably.”) 
281 Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1127 (1992) 
(footnotes omitted) 
282 Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992) 
(“If both parties perceive that one party has a highly favorable adjudicator, the case is unlikely to be tried.”) 
283 Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992)  
284 Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 169, 172 (1998) 
(“My thesis is that even though the empirical research consistently shows that punitive damages are rare and well-
controlled by the judiciary, this remedy plays a significant role in driving settlements. The empirical evidence 
suggests that the business community's fear of runaway punitive damages is exaggerated. However, what litigators 
‘define as real, becomes real in their consequences.’ A belief that punitive damages are ‘out of control’ and 
randomly assessed may create a self-fulfilling prophesy as parties negotiate claims according to their perceptions of 
the populist behavior of juries. Anecdote, hyperbole and simple confusion may shape settlements in a more powerful 
way than empirical truths.”) (footnotes omitted) 
285 Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1109 (1996) (“While critics 
claim that jury verdicts are irresponsible and capricious, serious students of the jury are virtually unanimous in their 
high regard for the jury as a decision-maker. Undoubtedly courts could improve juror performance in many ways, 
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punitive damages in tort jury and bench trial did not present a detectable difference.286 
Nevertheless, parties’ perception, or misperception, about juries is still relevant to settlements,287 
because parties do take in consideration who is the decisionmaker before deciding whether or not 
to settle a dispute, and in which basis to do so.288 Therefore, settlement rates are directly affected 
by the jury system. Whether juries increase or not these rates depends on how parties conceive 
their unpredictability. If they perceive juries as really unpredictable decisionmakers, juries 
should foster trials instead of settlements since parties are less prone to converge about the likely 
outcome of the case. However, if parties perceive juries as pro-plaintiff biased factfinders, parties 
should adjust their settlement behavior in order to take this jury feature in consideration. Since 
that bias makes juries more predictable than unpredictable, even if this predictability is just a 
misrepresentation of a jury’s impartiality, both parties should be more prone to converge about 
the probable trial outcome, increasing their chances of settling their case. Finally, it seems well 
accepted that, at least in tort litigation, a defendant’s perception of juries as pro-plaintiff 
decisionmakers makes her more willing to settle than to try her case, especially in light of the 
threat of a punitive damage award. 
B.3. The Costs of Jury Trials and Settlements. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
but researchers concur that jurors on the whole are conscientious, that they collectively understand and recall the 
evidence as well as judges, and that they decide factual issues on the basis of the evidence presented.”) (footnotes 
omitted) 
286 Thomas H. Cohen & Kyle Harbacek, Punitive Damages Awards in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 6 (Mar., 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdasc05.pdf 
287 Theodore Eisenberg, Neil LaFountain, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman, Martin T. & Wells, Juries, Judges, and 
Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 767 (2002) (“Because juries are believed to be 
more unpredictable than judges, especially in high-award cases, defendants may choose to settle cases that have high 
probabilities of large punitive awards…. Trials in cases in which jurors' propensity to award punitive damages is 
strongest may never be observed. Juries are viewed as so much wilder than judges that they only rarely get to act in 
those cases in which their behavior would be expected to be wildest.”) (footnotes omitted) 
288 Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992) 
(“Parties adjust their settlement behavior not only in light of the applicable legal standard, but also in light of the 
decisionmaker, including the mode of trial.”) 
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The trial stage of the civil litigation accounts for a great part of the transaction 
cost of a legal dispute, especially because of attorneys and expert witnesses’ fees. In order to 
measure the costs of each stage of the civil procedure, the National Center for State Courts 
(NCSC) has developed a method for cost estimation – the Civil Litigation Cost Model (CLCM) – 
relying on the amount of time expended by attorneys in various litigation tasks.289 Accordingly, 
cases were divided in 6 types: automobile tort, premises liability, real property dispute, breach of 
contract, employment dispute, and professional malpractice. Applying that model, Paula 
Hannaford-Argor and Nicole Waters found that “[f]or all case types, a trial is the single most 
time-intensive stage of litigation, encompassing between one-third and one-half of total litigation 
time in cases that progress all the way through trial.”290 Specifically regarding automobile tort 
cases, the trial stage accounted for 46% of the total median hours spent by attorneys during 
litigation.291 They also pointed out that approximately 80% of the expert witness expenses are 
allocated to the trial stage for expert testimony.292 A study commissioned by the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules also found that cases terminated by trial had higher costs, 
approximately 53% higher for plaintiffs, and 24% higher for defendants, than cases that did not 
                                                          
289 Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload Highlights, COURT 
STATISTICS PROJECT, 1 (Jan., 2013) http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
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292 Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload Highlights, COURT 
STATISTICS PROJECT, 5 n.2 (Jan., 2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx 
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terminated by trial, all else equal.293 The question, thus, is whether jury trials are more expensive 
than bench trials. 
Since the transaction costs of legal disputes are proportional to the time spent by 
parties during the litigation, 294 the answer for which type of trial costs the most (whether trial by 
jury or judge) depends on their length. Two measures of time might be used here. One related to 
how long litigants have to wait before and after trial until the final disposition of the case, and 
the other related to how long the actual in-court trial lasts.295 Regarding the first measure, a civil 
justice survey of state courts found that the mean case processing time from filing to disposition 
was 26.6 months for jury trials, as opposed to 20.8 months for bench trials.296 However, in the 
federal judicial system the reality seems to be the opposite. Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin 
Clermont explain that in federal courts “the mean judge-tried case spends 755 days on the 
docket, while the mean jury-tried case terminates in 678 days. Medians tell the same story: the 
median judge case took 619 days and the median jury case took 566 days.”297 One reason for that 
difference might be that “the state courts, unlike the federal courts, are imposing waiting costs 
upon those who wish a jury trial and not on those who agree to a bench trial, with the effect of 
                                                          
293 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER (Mar., 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf 
294 Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011), 
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national attorney surveys with Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers, members of the American Bar 
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295 Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Which Is Speedier?, 79 JUDICATURE 176, 1 
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296 Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
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178 (1996) 
71 
 
discouraging jury trials.”298 Nevertheless, since the longer it takes to a case reach termination, 
the higher the litigation costs,299 the answer for whether or not jury trials are more expensive 
than bench trials might depend on whether the case is tried in a state or federal court. 
On the other hand, according to the other measure, the in-court trial length 
measure, jury trials seem to consume much more time from parties, lawyers, witnesses and 
experts than bench trials.300 In fact, according to Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin Clermont: 
The available data generally agree that jury trials take about twice 
as long as judge trials, although admittedly trials on average are 
rather short so that the absolute difference is not great. Most of 
these studies do not control for the type of case but, instead, simply 
compare lengths of all jury trials and all judge trials. Nevertheless, 
rough attempts to control for the type of case confirm that jury 
trials take about twice as long. Certainly, most opinions agree that 
jury trials last longer. The theory is that the extra steps of jury trial, 
such as jury selection and instructions, more than consume such 
savings as the possible streamlining of evidence for presentation to 
the jury.301 
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In fact, according to a civil justice survey of state court, “jury trials lasted two days longer on 
average than bench trials.”302 The same survey also pointed out that 70% of bench trials were 
completed within one day, while only 13% of jury trials lasted that short.303 
Since longer trials consume more attorney and expert witness billable hours,304 
cases tried by juries are expected to be more expensive than cases tried by judges, all else equal. 
Providing some jury figures, a study performed by Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud, involving 
cases tried in California Superior Courts, showed that the average jury trial length is nine days 
and the average deliberation length is nine hours.305 In the same study, the authors deemed fair to 
assume an average spent of approximately $5,000 per day for each side of the dispute, for cases 
tried in 1990-91. 306 Accordingly, the average jury trial used to cost roughly $45,000 for each 
party in the beginning of the 90’s. 
From an economic standpoint, considering the average length of a jury trial, the 
prospect of a jury trial should foster more settlements than the prospect of a bench trial. 
According to the economic model of civil litigation, whenever parties have the same 
expectations about the trial outcome, they should settle the dispute in order to save the trial 
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costs.307 In fact, because of the American rule, which provides that each party should bear his/her 
own litigation costs, making even the winner fall short of full compensation, 308 both parties are 
economically incentivized to settle the dispute as soon as possible. Since litigants are always 
looking for the most efficient way to resolve their disputes, minimizing costs and maximizing 
gains, the higher the trial costs the more they should be prone to settle the case.309 Because jury 
trials usually present higher costs than bench trials, all else equal, the threat of a jury’s 
adjudication cost should make the parties more willing to settle their dispute. 
IV – Conclusion. 
All man-made systems are concerned with efficiency, including the civil justice 
system. This premise was adopted by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when 
they aimed equally justice, speed and cost as goals for the interpretation and administration of 
the rules. An economic model for determining system efficiency is easily accepted in civil 
litigation of purely economic and private matters. This acceptance is due to the public perception 
of justice as a private peace between litigants instead of a search for truth or an opportunity for 
advancing public policies. Since settlements prevent public and private expenditures with trials, 
appeals, and judicial enforcement, they provide a faster and cheaper resolution for conflicts than 
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309 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
399, 418 (1973) (“Anything that reduces the plaintiff’s minimum offer or increases the defendant’s maximum offer, 
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a judge or jury adjudication. In this context, whether from a pre-trial or post-trial standpoint, 
settlements accomplish economic efficiency for both state and parties. 
In light of the private and public advantages of a settlement, it is important to 
understand what fosters the consensual resolution of civil disputes in the United States so it may 
be promoted. Since economic efficiency is the most accepted model, settlements should occur 
when they express the best cost/benefit relationship to the parties. Therefore, in order to 
understand the reasons for settlements in civil litigation it is necessary to understand the costs of 
resolving legal disputes and the way these costs are allocated in the American civil justice 
system. The American attorney’s fee arrangements, the lack of public finance for litigation, and 
the restrictions on cost-shifting altogether contribute to the American high settlement rate. 
Moreover, legal institutes such as discovery and civil jury trials play a decisive role in the 
amount of cases that settle before trial. In fact, the information symmetry caused by discovery as 
well as its costs drive parties towards a consensual resolution of their disputes. In the same way 
the threat of an unpredictable, long and expensive civil jury trial makes both parties more willing 
to settle than to try their case. As a result, most cases settle. Therefore, the vanishing U.S. trial is 
not an accident but a consequence of procedural tools and public policies that externalize an 
American predilection for settlements instead of trials. 
